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1 Introduction 
Today, peer-to-peer technology has reached the peak of its popularity. 
Currently, P2P file sharing represents the dominant usage component of 
Internet bandwidth. Moreover, P2P networks enable sharing of other 
different computer resources and services, including distributed 
(collaborative) computing, processing cycles,  instant messaging, CPU and 
storage resources, etc. 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) is a communication model in which multiple autonomous 
devices interact as equals. In a pure P2P network each node implements 
functions of both client and server, and either peer can initiate a 
communication session at any moment.  
In terms of Internet users, P2P is a sort of “transient” network that allows a 
group of computers with the same networking software (P2P client) to 
directly access files from one another's hard drives via Internet connection – 
simple to join, simple to use. Nevertheless, P2P network is a quite complex 
system that represents a synthesis of several technological components, and 
one of them is overlay network.    
Nowadays, overlay networks based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) are a 
building block of many peer-to-peer applications. DHT mechanisms provide 
guaranteed data retrieval, moderate lookup times, automatic load balancing 
and self-organizing data storage and lookup system [1]. 
However, DHT-based peer-to-peer networks represent a particular 
environment susceptible to some specific threats and attacks due to their 
completely distributed nature without any centralized control. Generally, 
these attacks are caused by malicious behaviour of some nodes of the 
network and aimed at routing and lookup processes. 
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This thesis is meant to find solutions for some specific security problems of 
DHT-based P2P environment. At the same time, it is also proposed to exploit 
the advantages of DHT mechanisms applying them to systems where they 
can be effective against some particular problems. In other words, the 
research was conducted in two directions:  
• DHT as an object to specific attacks; 
• DHT as a security improving tool. 
Regarding the first direction, we propose some solutions based on the use of 
trust and reputation evaluation mechanisms to cope with some types of 
specific attacks of DHT environment. The character of interactions between 
peers and the presence of “misbehaving” and “honest” peers indicate an 
analogy between P2P environment and human communities. So, it makes 
sense to apply reputation evaluation techniques to avoid further contacts with 
nodes that have already demonstrated malevolent behaviour in order to 
resolve the problem of polluting routing tables by malicious contacts.  
In this work a detailed analysis of applicability of several existent reputation 
evaluation techniques as protection from some types of attacks in DHT-based 
P2P networks is presented. Possibilities of incorporation of some reputation 
mechanisms in DHT routing and lookup processes are analysed. Then we 
propose a solution that combines different reputation management 
instruments involved by some analyzed techniques in order to provide a 
single peer with necessary individual instruments to analyze and 
independently evaluate reputation and trustworthiness of other peers.  
Following this direction, we also apply Byzantine Agreement (BA) concept 
and some existing solutions for Byzantine failure to cope with some types of 
malicious activity in P2P networks. It is motivated by analogy between 
Byzantine failure adversary model and some specific attacks in DHT-based 
environments. We propose to integrate algorithms for Byzantine Agreement  
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proposed  by Lamport, Shostak and Pease for distributed computer systems 
and some reputation mechanisms designed for DHT-based P2P networks. 
The goal is to obtain a simpler and efficient reputation management 
algorithm for the completely distributed P2P environment.  
The second direction concerns possibilities of application of DHT 
mechanisms for data storage and retrieval to systems with a hierarchical 
organization (such as enterprise networks) instead of use a client-server 
model.  Now, many corporations are looking at the advantages of using P2P 
as a way for employees to share files without expenses caused by maintaining 
a centralized server, and as a way for businesses to exchange information 
with each other directly. For example, many companies of healthcare 
industry, along with the scientific research and development sectors, use 
distributed information infrastructure offered by P2P technology to exchange 
and retrieve important data.  
It is proposed to apply DHT principles to enterprise networks in order to 
avoid some typical problems of centralized environments regarding 
information security, data retrieval efficiency and reliability. We introduce a 
distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) data organization system into the enterprise 
environment in order to create a system that exploits hardware and memory 
resources of all terminals of the network, provides a reliable data storage 
system and possibilities of effective collaboration between geographically 
distant users. The presented solution is based on application of Kademlia 
DHTs to an enterprise data sharing system. 
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2 DHT-based P2P Networks 
2.1 Overlay Networks 
Overlay network is an important functional component of most peer-to-peer 
applications. This is a virtual network where the nodes are connected with 
each other by logic or virtual links, and each of these links corresponds to a 
path that consists of multiple physical links of an exploited transport network 
(Fig. 2.1). For example, P2P networks are overlay networks in relation to 
Internet, while Internet via dial-up connection is an overlay for a telephone 
network. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1Overaly Network 
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Regarding P2P environment, overlay networks create a structured virtual 
topology above the basic transport protocol level for implementing lookup 
processes and some supplementary services. Overlay networks enable routing 
of messages between peers and search of resources (i.e. IP addresses of nodes 
that host them) according to predefined lookup protocol. 
This work considers structured overlay networks based on Distributed Hash 
Tables (DHT). Recently, a great number of P2P platforms have adopted DHT 
lookup mechanisms: eDonkey (Kademlia), BitTorrent (Kademlia), CFS 
(Chord), OceanStore (Tapestry), etc.  
In DHT-based systems a group of distributed hosts collectively manages a 
mapping from keys to data values without any fixed hierarchy and with very 
little human assistance. It is realized in accordance with some predefined 
lookup algorithm, e.g. CAN, Chord, Pastry, Tapestry, Kademlia. DHT-based 
overlay networks provide guaranteed data retrieval, moderate lookup times, 
automatic load balancing and self-organizing data storage and lookup system 
[1]. Let’s consider how do DHT mechanisms work.  
2.2 Distributed Hash Tables 
The base of a typical DHT-based network is a routing table-based lookup 
service, which maps a given key to a node that is responsible for the key 
using a hash function. In such system each node is analogous to an array slot 
in a hash table.  
Responsibility for maintaining the mapping from names to values is 
distributed among all nodes, in such a way that a change in a set of 
participants causes a minimal probability of disruption. This allows DHTs to 
scale to extremely large numbers of participants and to handle continual 
joins, leaves, and failures of nodes.  
 DHT-based P2P networks 15 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 Data storage and retrieval in DHT-based networks 
 
For example, to publish a resource with some predefined name, a user should 
convert its name to a numeric key using a hash function. Then the publisher 
invokes a “lookup (key)” operation and sends a file with corresponding 
metadata to a node with an identifier coinciding with the key (Fig.2.2). The 
latter should store the file. So, another node, that needs to get this file, should 
only convert its name into the key, invoke a “lookup (key)” and request a 
resulting node for a copy of the required file [2]. Hence, the lookup process 
in such type of networks consists in defining the closest node to a key 
corresponding to some desired resource. It is important to note, that the 
concept of  “closeness” in DHT-based systems depends on the type of lookup 
scheme used. 
For instance, in Chord the closeness is defined by a numeric difference 
between two IDs; in Pastry and Tapestry it depends on a number of equal bits 
in prefixes of two IDs; in Kademlia it’s calculated by XOR function applied 
to a pair of IDs. Anyway, the concept of closeness in this case has nothing in 
common with geographical distance and concerns only key-space. 
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Depending on the mode of organization of the identifier space DHT-based 
lookup algorithms can implement routing in one dimension (Chord, Pastry, 
Tapestry, Kademlia) and multiple dimensions (CAN). 
The data structure of routing tables maintained by existing DHT lookup 
protocols can present: 
• skip-list (Chord);  
• tree-like data structure (Pastry, Tapestry, Kademlia); 
• rectangles (CAN). 
The lookup process can be realized in iterative or in recursive mode. In the 
case of iterative lookup (Fig.2.3), a search query is sent to a node that is 
considered by a requestor to be the “closest” to a desired key amongst all 
contacts maintained in its routing table. If that node is not responsible for the 
key, it replies with an ID of the next hop of the lookup. Then the querying 
peer redirects its request according to this reply. Iterative routing can be 
performed concurrently, with multiple outstanding requests to decrease 
latency and reduce the impact of timeouts [3]. 
When we deal with a recursive lookup (Fig.2.4), the first contacted node 
forwards the query to a node it regards “closer” to the key than itself without 
any reply to the lookup initiator. This process continues until the key is found 
and the query is satisfied.     
Despite the particular differences in data structure and routing 
implementation, all DHT protocols for data storage and retrieval are based on 
the idea of consistent hashing and they share the following fundamental 
principle: route a message to a node responsible for an identifier in 
)(log NO b steps using a certain routing metric where N is the number of 
nodes in the system and b is the base of the logarithm with values (2, 4, 16…) 
[4]. 
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Fig. 2.3Iterative lookup [3] 
 
 
 
Fig.2.4 Recursive lookup [3] 
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In the following sections we briefly describe the original DHT protocols 
mentioned above. 
2.2.1 Chord 
Chord is a lookup protocol based on consistent hashing that provides fast 
distributed computation of a hash function mapping keys to nodes 
responsible for them. This mechanism assigns each node and key (resource) a 
unique m-bit identifier using a base hash function such as SHA-1. A node’s 
identifier is a result of hashing the node’s IP address, while a key identifier is 
produced by hashing the key.   
Chord views the identifier space as a circle formed by no more than m2 nodes 
(where m = 160) with identifiers/keys ranging from 0 to 12 −m  [5]. 
Each node of a Chord network maintains two data structures: 
• successor list; 
• finger table.  
The first is a list of peers immediately succeeding the key in the identifier 
circle in a clockwise direction. So, a node with the smallest ID that is greater 
than or equal to i represents the successor of a key (or node identifier) i. 
Chord defines a key’s successor as a node responsible for the key.  
Figure 2.5 shows a simple example of a Chord identifier circle represented by 
three nodes with identifiers 0, 1 and 3 that are successors of keys 6, 1 and 2 
respectively. 
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Fig.2.5 Identifier space organization in Chord [5] 
 
This hashing scheme lets nodes join and leave a network with minimal 
disruption. When a node n leaves a network, all the keys it is responsible for 
should be reassigned to its successor. In the case when a node n joins a 
network, certain keys previously assigned to n’s successor pass to n. To join 
a Chord network, a node contacts any peer in the network and requests for an 
ID to be assigned to the “newcomer”. Once the ID is assigned, the node 
occupies an appropriate position in the identifier circle, and the predecessors 
of the newly joined peer update their successor lists.  
A finger table is a routing table which contains IP addresses of peers halfway 
around the ID space from the node, a quarter-of-the-way, an eighth-of-the-
way and so forth in a data structure that resembles a skip-list (Fig. 2.6). The 
size of a Chord routing table is N2log , where N is the number of nodes in 
the network. If a node is looking for a resource with a key k, it forwards the 
query to a node in its finger table with the highest ID not exceeding k. Due to 
the skip-list structure a desired key can be reached in )(log2 NO steps.  
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Fig.2.6  Skip-list -like data structure of a routing table in Chord [5] 
Hence, we can conclude that a successor list is required for maintaining the 
correct organization of the identifier space and data structure, while a finger 
table is meant to speedup lookup processes [3]. The lookup in Chord can be 
implemented in both iterative and recursive modes, but the requests should be 
forwarded sequentially.    
2.2.2 CAN 
Content-Addressable Network (CAN) is a distributed infrastructure that 
provides “hash table-like functionality on Internet-like scales” [6]. CAN is a 
scalable, fault tolerant and completely self-organizing system. To organize 
the identifier space CAN uses a virtual d-dimensional Cartesian coordinate 
space. A hush function is applied to deterministically map keys (file names) 
into points in a logical coordinate space. This coordinate space is partitioned 
dynamically among the peers of the network such that each peer covers a 
certain region (zone) within the overall space (Fig. 2.7).  
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Fig. 2.7 Bidemensional CAN identifier space with 6 nodes [6] 
 
A peer is responsible for storing (key, value) pairs for those keys that are 
hashed into a point which is located within a zone it covers. Each peer 
maintains a routing table that contains IP addresses of all neighbour nodes 
whose virtual coordinate zones are contiguous to its own zone. In a d-
dimensional coordinate space, two nodes are neighbours if their coordinate 
spans overlap along d -1 dimensions and abut along one dimension. 
A lookup operation consists in routing a query towards its destination along a 
path that approximates a straight between a querying node and a point with 
the destination coordinates (Fig.2.8). It is implemented by simple greedy 
forwarding to the neighbor peer  closest to the destination. 
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Fig. 2.8 Lookup in CAN [6] 
 
To join the network a peer chooses a casual point P in the coordinate space. 
Then, the peer contacts a node already in the network and initiates a lookup 
for a node n whose zone contains P. Once the node n is found, its zone 
should be split in half and one half should be assigned to the new node.  
To update routing tables all node should send an update message followed by 
periodic refreshes, with their currently assigned zone to all their neighbours. 
A too long absence of an update message from a peer indicates its failure. 
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2.2.3 Kademlia 
Kademlia [7] is a DHT-based peer-to-peer system based on the XOR metric. 
So, the distance between to identifiers is defined as: d (x,y) = x XOR y.  
All nodes and resources in this system have 160-bit identifiers (keys). The 
data are replicated by finding k (the recommended value for k is 20) closest 
nodes to a key and storing the key/value pair on them. As it was noted above 
Kademlia has a tree-like data structure. So, Kademlia considers network 
nodes as leafs of a binary tree (Fig.2.9).  
Routing processes are implemented in prefix-matching mode. The routing 
table size is N2log  (N is a number of nodes in the network) [4]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.9 Kademlia binary tree: node 0011… and sub-trees where it has 
contacts [7] 
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Fig.2.10 Routing table data structure in Kademlia [7] 
 
Each Kademlia node stores information about IP address, UDP port and node 
ID for nodes from the interval: [ )12;2 +∈ iid . 
Nodes from this interval form a group called k-bucket (Fig. 2.10). So, a 
Kademlia network can be presented as a bucket table. Due to the mechanism 
of k-bucket a Kademlia node has at least one contact in each sub-tree. This 
facilitates and makes faster lookup and routing processes: the lookup speed 
can be increased by considering b bits (instead of one bit) at each step, 
reaching a desired resource in less time. 
The symmetry of XOR-metric provides peers with a possibility to learn and 
update routing information from queries they receive during a lookup 
process. So, in Kademlia updates of routing tables are implemented by nodes 
automatically, as a “secondary effect” of ordinary lookups and interactions 
with other nodes. 
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Fig. 2.11 Kademlia lookup [8] 
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Kademlia uses iterative lookup that is performed in parallel mode [4]: a host 
contacts peers with progressively smaller XOR distances to the target ID in 
turn.  
As shown in the figure 2.11, the node with prefix 0011… initiates the process 
of look-up for some resource, sending FIND_VALUE RPC to a node 
residing in another sub-tree that is considered as closer to the target resource. 
The contacted node returns a triple <IP address, UDP port, Node ID> for 
node 1101… that is closer to the target than itself, and so on. As we can see, 
every step of the lookup process narrows a ”search area” until the target node 
is localized.  
2.2.4 Pastry 
Pastry assigns to each node a unique numeric identifier consisting of 128 bit. 
Like in Chord, all node identifiers in Pastry can be logically positioned in a 
circular identifier space [9]. However, routing tables has a tree-like structure  
and lookup processes are performed by prefix-matching. 
Each Pastry node maintains a routing table, a neighbour set and a leaf set.  
A peer’s routing table is organized into Nb2log rows with 12 −
b entries 
each (Fig. 2.12).  So, a routing table contains IP addresses of peers with no 
prefix match, with b bits prefix match, 2b bits prefix match and so on, where 
b is a configuration parameter (typically b=4).  
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Fig. 2.12 Routing table of a Pastry node with node ID 65a1x, b=4 [9] 
 
The leaf-set L of a node n contains information about |L|/2 closest nodes with 
identifiers that are numerically smaller than that of the node n and |L|/2 
closest nodes with identifiers that are numerically larger than that of the node 
n ( |L| is a configuration parameter with a typical value of 16 or 32). The leaf-
set in Pastry is conceptually similar to the Chord’s successor list.   
Routing in Pastry is recursive: each host forwards a lookup message along a 
chain of nodes to a destination. At each step of a routing process a contacted 
peer tries to route a lookup message to a node whose ID contains a longer 
sequence of bits coinciding with those of a sought key than its own ID     
(Fig. 2.13).  
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Fig. 2.13 Routing of a lookup message from node 65a1fc to key d46a1c in 
Pastry identifier space. Black points represent currently active peers [9]   
 
To join a Pastry network a node should contact any active node in the 
network that implements bootstrap functions for the newcomer. It is realized 
in the following mode: a new node with identifier X tries to get an active 
status sending to some currently active node a special message and using X 
as a key. The message is forwarded by hop-by-hop routing to a node Z whose 
ID is the closest to X. Then X obtains from Z information about the 
neighbourhood in order to build its own leaf set. To create its routing table X 
uses routing data obtained along the path from the bootstrap node to Z. After 
that, the newcomer announces its “alive” status to the neighbourhood. So, the 
neighbour nodes should update their routing tables and leaf sets taking in 
consideration the presence of the new node. 
In the case of leaving the network by some node, only leaf sets of neighbours 
are immediately updated; routing tables data are corrected on demand, only 
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when some node tries to contact a node that is currently is not available.    
2.2.5 Tapestry  
Tapestry [10] DHT structure is very similar to Pastry system. However, there 
are some differences regarding key mapping and management of data 
replicas.  
Tapestry is an extensible infrastructure that provides decentralized object 
location and routing focusing on efficiency and minimizing message latency. 
This is achieved since Tapestry constructs only locally optimal routing tables 
and maintains them in order to reduce routing stretch (Fig.2.14). 
Furthermore, Tapestry allows flexible data (objects) distribution according to 
particular needs of a given application. 
 
 
Fig. 2.14 Tapestry routing mesh from the point of view of a single 
node. Outgoing links point to nodes with a prefix match. Higher 
level entries match more digits. Together these links represent a 
local routing table [10] 
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Each node is assigned a unique nodeID. All node identifiers are uniformly 
distributed in a large identifier space. Tapestry uses SHA-1 to produce a 160-
bit identifier space represented by a 40 digit hex key. Pastry defines specific 
endpoints GUID's  that are similarly assigned unique identifiers. NodeID's 
and GUID's are roughly and evenly distributed in the identifier space.  
Tapestry implements so called “surrogate routing” (Fig.2.15). At each hop of 
a routing process a message is progressively routed closer to a targeted key 
by incremental suffix routing. Each routing table has multiple levels, and 
each level contains links to nodes with IDs matching up to a certain digit 
position. It means that level 1 has links to nodes with IDs that have nothing in 
common, contacts of level 2 have the first digit in common, etc. When a 
certain digit of an ID cannot be matched, a lookup is redirected to some 
“close” digit. So, each nonexistent ID is mapped to some live node with a 
similar ID. The number of hops in a routing process in Tapestry is defined as 
log2
bN (N is a number of nodes in the network).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.15 Lookup routing in Tapestry [10] 
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To join the network a node sends a multicast message to all active nodes with 
the same prefix (i.e. to those of them that share with the newcomer the 
longest sequence of digits of the ID). These nodes should add the new contact 
to their routing tables. Then, the nodes contact the new node to provide a 
temporary neighborhood list. After that, the new node performs an iterative 
search for the nearest neighbor contacts to fill all levels of its routing table.  
Leaving the network a node informs other nodes about its intention and 
communicates IDs of replacing nodes for each level of the routing table. 
Resources and data stored at the leaving node are redistributed or provided 
from redundant copies. 
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3 Vulnerabilities and Security 
Threats in DHT-based P2P 
Environment 
3.1 Specific attacks  
In a DHT-based P2P network adversaries are represented by participants of 
its own distributed hash lookup system that do not follow the protocol 
correctly [1]. Thus, this environment is vulnerable to some specific threats 
and attacks that are generally caused by malevolent behaviour of some nodes 
of the network and aimed at routing and lookup processes. 
Routing attacks that take place in P2P systems using DHT-mechanisms 
usually consist in incorrect lookup routing, incorrect routing updates and 
partitions. Let's consider them in details.  
Incorrect lookup routing takes place when some malicious peer tries to 
forward lookup process to an incorrect or non-existent node (Fig.3.1). As we 
know, the lookup process in such type of networks consists in defining the 
“closest” node to a key corresponding to some desired resource. So, each step 
of the lookup is supposed to get closer to the node responsible for the key. 
But a malicious peer can confuse the process of routing claiming that some 
random node is the closest to a sought key. Hence, lookup process can be 
directed incorrectly and this can prevent a pair key/value from being found. 
The figure below represents  incorrect lookup routing in CAN. The initiator 
(the node with coordinates  [0.0, 0.5, 0.5]) starts the lookup for a key stored 
at node [0.75, 0.75, 0.1]. At the third step of the lookup the malicious node 
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Fig. 3.1Incorrect lookup routing in CAN 
 
incorrectly forwards the query to node [0.75, 0.1, 0.5]. So, this step annuls 
the search progress that has been reached previously. Anyway, the lookup 
process can be “saved” by backtracking to the precedent correct step and 
asking for an alternative hop that maybe offers less progress but directs the 
lookup in a correct manner.  
Incorrect routing updates take place when a malicious peer corrupts routing 
tables of other peers by sending them incorrect updates. It is possible because 
in P2P networks using mechanisms of DHT peers create their routing tables 
by consulting each other. As result, “well-behaving” peers direct their queries 
to inappropriate or non-existent nodes, as in the case with incorrect lookup 
routing. 
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Fig.3.2Partitions in CAN 
 
The problem of partition appears while bootstrapping a new peer, i.e. when a 
new node contacts some already active peer to join the network. So, if some 
malicious peer has been chosen as a bootstrap node, the newcomer can be 
partitioned into an incorrect (parallel) network created by a set of malevolent 
nodes. Fig.3.2 illustrates partitions in CAN network: the newcomer has 
chosen the point P in the coordinate space to join the network. Unfortunately, 
the node contacted for bootstrapping is malicious and the point P belongs to a 
zone controlled by the malicious peer [0.75, 0.75, 0.1]. So, our newcomer is 
partitioned into the network segment controlled by malevolent users.  
The same happens when one of the malicious nodes is cross-registered in the 
“right” network. So it is able to make new nodes to be connected to the 
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parallel network even if firstly a legitimate node has been contacted to 
effectuate the bootstrapping process [1]. 
Rapid joins and leaves represent another type of malicious activity that 
causes rebalancing process on the network and, as a result, an unjustified 
excess of data transfers. 
Inconsistent behaviour of some node is manifested in its correct behaviour in 
respect of certain nodes (for instance, its “neighbours” in the identifier space) 
and misbehaving in regard to others. So, neighbour nodes don't remove such 
malicious contacts from their routing tables giving them the possibility to 
participate in routing processes and to continue confusing “less lucky” peers.   
Some malicious nodes can follow rules of a lookup protocol correctly, but 
deny the existence of resources they are responsible for or refuse to provide 
interested users with these resources. In this case we deal with storage and 
retrieval attacks. 
Sybil attack consists in forging multiple identities by a malicious entity in 
order to obtain the possibility to act as a number of peers with different 
identities. This type of malicious activity exploits the mechanism of 
identifier-to-key (ID-to-key) mapping that represents a basic element of 
DHT-based P2Psystems [2]. As we know, a DHT-based overlay network 
uses a virtual addressing scheme based on logical identifiers obtained through 
consistent hashing. Such scheme provides for each entity of the underlay 
network a corresponding unique identity in the overlay network, i.e. forms a 
“ID-to-key” mapping pair for each entry [3]. In the case of the Sybil attack 
malevolent nodes break “one entity-one identity” relation spoofing multiple 
identities.  
In the next section we describe several countermeasures and protective 
mechanisms provided by DHT-based lookup algorithms to cope with some 
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effects of the above attacks.   
3.2 Countermeasures 
The self-organizing nature of DHTs enables some countermeasures against 
several effects of different types of malicious activity described in the 
previous section.  
Incorrect lookup routing can be detected by checking the progress of lookup 
at each step. In the case of absence of any progress (blatantly incorrect query 
forwarding), lookup process is backtracked to the previous “right” step and 
then proceeds with looking for an alternative direction of the search that 
maybe offers less progress but leads to a desired target. This checking 
procedure makes the routing and lookup processes slower, but helps to 
prevent a lookup from failure.  
In the lookup algorithms with iterative character (Kademlia, Chord) incorrect 
lookup rooting is easy to detect due to the possibility of lookup progress 
control at each step after a corresponding <key; value> pair has been returned 
by a contacted peer.  
In the case of recursive lookup it is problematic to apply verifying 
mechanisms at each step, as a query is forwarded without interacting with the 
requestor. So, this countermeasure is not applicable to recursive lookup. 
Incorrect routing updates can be prevented by setting certain requirements for 
correct routing updates that should be verified. For example, in Pastry routing 
updates are considered as correct if each table entry has a correct prefix. So, 
blatantly incorrect updates can be easily identified and annulled. Hence, it is 
important to verify whether a newly updated contact is reachable (existent) 
before introducing it into a routing table [1]. 
In Kademlia the problem of incorrect routing updates is solved due to the 
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particular mechanism of updates used in this system: every routing table 
update is implemented by a Kademlia node automatically, as a “secondary 
effect” of ordinary lookups and interactions with other nodes. In this mode 
each update inserted into a routing table is verified by the previous 
experience of the node.  
The problem of inconsistent behaviour may be resolved by implementing 
routing by short hops only through close (“locally good”) nodes. In this case 
each participant of the lookup has to demonstrate a good behaviour 
interacting only with its neighbours. As we know, misbehaving is not 
convenient for malicious nodes in this case because it causes removing 
malevolent contacts from routing tables and, as a result, impossibility to 
participate in further routing processes. However, almost all routing systems 
use hops toward distant points in the identifier space to reach a desired key in 
less time [1].  
Storage and retrieval attacks can be prevented by replication of files using 
multiple hash functions. In such way we avoid the responsibility of a single 
node for replication or facilitating access to the replicas. So, if some node 
refuses to provide a sought resource, the last can be obtained from another 
responsible peer. 
To resolve the problem of partitions it is proposed to implement 
bootstrapping through some trusted nodes. The trusted nodes can be 
represented by some predefined authority or by some nodes that have been 
previously discovered or successfully used as bootstrap by a node rejoining 
the network.    
Sybil attacks cannot be excluded in a distributed computing environment, but 
a lookup efficiency can be improved by parallel routing (issuing α lookup 
requests at a time) [4]. The solution that is frequently used to resolve this 
problem is establishing a trusted certificate authority that can guarantee a 
one-to-one correspondence between entity and identity [5].  
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3.3 Summary      
The countermeasures provided by the nature of DHT-based lookup 
algorithms have a “short-term” character: they help to cope only with 
instantaneous effects of malicious activity and usually don’t resolve a 
problem of detection and elimination of malevolent contacts from routing 
tables. Moreover, as we have seen, for some specific security problems of 
DHT-based environment opportune countermeasures don’t exist (e.g. 
incorrect routing updates in the case of recursive lookups, inconsistent 
behaviour, Sybil attacks).    
As mentioned above, some solutions require use of centralization elements 
that contradict the completely distributed nature of P2P networks. Moreover, 
it means introducing into the system a central critical point and significant 
increase of maintenance costs. Thus, such solutions involve some typical 
problems of centralized systems. 
In the next chapter some ways to resolve the above problems are proposed. 
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4 Trust and reputation 
management in DHT-based P2P 
Environment 
“…Ideas that have great results are always simple ones.  
My whole idea is that if vicious people are united and constitute a power,  
then honest folk must do the same. Now that's simple enough…” 
    Lev Tolstoy, “War and Peace”, 1869 
 
To resolve some security problems considered before there is need to apply 
mechanisms based on analysis of the activity of peers and the acquired 
reputation in order to “clear” routing tables from contacts that have evinced 
malicious or inconsistent behaviour to avoid them in the future.  
Applying opportune mechanisms for verifying lookup progress, the querying 
node can make a conclusion about “honesty” of the nodes participating in the 
lookup process, assigning to them the corresponding reputation values. 
Analogically, a node that honestly shares its resources with other nodes gets 
reputation “points”, and a node denying the existence of data it is responsible 
for (storage and retrieval attacks), loses them.  
In the case of recursive lookups to avoid forwarding queries to malicious 
peers (incorrect lookup routing), all participating nodes (not only a lookup 
initiator but also each intermediate node) should control all stored reputation 
values and choose among possible hops the most reliable one. 
Reputation techniques based on exchange and analysis of opinions of 
different nodes can be used in the case of inconsistent behaviour. These 
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techniques can be applied to make nodes realize that some “locally good” 
nodes are malicious in respect to distant peers. 
Thus, to cope with some types of malicious activity the collaboration 
between “honest” network nodes is indispensable.  
In this chapter we analyze possibility of application of existent reputation 
techniques to DHT-based P2P systems.  
We also propose integration of reputation mechanisms with other instruments 
used in distributed computing environment in order to improve resilience of 
such systems to destructive actions of malevolent or faulty components. The 
goal of this integration is to obtain a more efficient, less expensive (in terms 
of data transferred, computational resources involved and time spent) and 
possibly simple solution to cope with the specific problems of DHT-based 
environment described in Chapter 3. 
4.1 Reputation in P2P 
In P2P networks, like in any human community, nodes (users) interact, create 
new contacts, and progressively gain their own experience and reputation. 
These two factors help them to evaluate trustworthiness of other nodes and to 
understand what kind of behaviour can be expected from a certain node. 
Hence, the entities that enjoy a high reputation are considered as trusted.  
According to Abdul-Rehman and Hailes [1]“reputation is an expectation 
about an individual’s behaviour based on information about or observations 
of its past behaviour”. So, we can see that the reputation and the experience 
are particularly interrelated factors. To evaluate the reputation of some 
individual it is possible to use an own direct experience, recommendations 
and experiences of other persons, or all these factors. 
The reputation is an integral part of the trust concept and it is very important 
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for the establishment of trust relationships between two entities. Grandison 
and Sloman [2] define trust as “the firm belief in the competence of an entity 
to act dependably, securely and reliably within a specified context”. So, 
while the reputation concept considers only real facts regarding the behaviour 
and the activity of some entity in the past to evaluate a level of 
trustworthiness of the entity, the trust often can be based on such subjective 
factors as recommendations of some friends, intuition or banal sympathy.  
Recently, a number of trust and reputation management techniques for P2P 
networks has been proposed by different researchers. 
All existing decentralized trust management techniques for P2P communities 
can be divided in two groups depending on the approach used to establish 
and evaluate trust relationships between peers [3]:  
• credential and policy based  
• reputation based.   
In credential and policy based trust management systems peers use a set of 
credentials and policies to determine whether a certain peer can be trusted or 
not. This approach is typically used for authorization and access control in 
open systems, and it is meant for systems with strong protection 
requirements. Obviously, in this case the presence of some sort of 
certification authority is required. Such techniques often require a central 
server for storing and distributing reputation information. Therefore, 
credential and policy based mechanisms are to be applied in centralized 
systems with a hierarchical structure.  
The backbone of each reputation-based technique is a trust computational 
model that provides mechanisms to evaluate the level of trust toward both a 
resource and its possessor. In this case the reputation management is based 
only on the recommendations and direct experiences of the users. Normally, 
the data (opinions regarding reputation of other users) exchanged by the 
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peers is not signed by certification authorities, but it can be self-signed by the 
source of the information [4]. 
4.2 Reputation management 
techniques for DHT-based P2P 
networks 
In the case of completely distributed DHT-based P2P networks, we need the 
techniques providing mechanisms that can be realized in decentralized 
systems with instruments applicable to the overlay network environment. In 
such networks a central server, that assigns a univocal reputation value to 
each peer, is absent. So, each single peer should be provided with all 
necessary means to analyze and independently evaluate the reputation and the 
trustworthiness level of other peers.  
Thus, taking in consideration the particularities of deploying reputation 
mechanisms in a DHT setting, we introduce the following applicability 
criteria for reputation mechanisms:  
1. technical realizability in overlay networks;  
2. availability of individual reputation evaluation instruments. 
The first criterion is related to a category of reputation evaluation technique: 
pure reputation or with credential and policy elements.   
The second criterion is represented by some different parameters, such as:  
• possibility to provide recommendations;  
• possibility to “weigh” recommendations, i.e. recommendations from 
different peers have different levels of trustworthiness; 
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• responsibility for the behaviour of recommended entities;   
• evaluation of the community context (the average level of 
vulnerability of the network environment and the level of 
cooperation between peers);  
• incentives for feedback compilation.     
A reputation technique that satisfies the above criteria can provide a single 
node with all necessary instruments for independent evaluation of 
trustworthiness levels of other nodes. Only techniques based on pure 
reputation mechanisms without credential and policy elements can offer this 
possibility.  
Reputation techniques specifically designed for DHT-based networks are 
heavily based only on evaluation mechanisms of successful and unsuccessful 
downloads. These techniques regard only file sharing P2P applications [5,6]. 
However, P2P technology also supports instant messaging, collaborative 
applications, distributed computing, etc.  
In the last few years P2P systems have been successfully used for sharing 
computation under various distributed computing projects like 
FightAIDS@Home, Genome@Home, Seti@Home, United Devices Cancer 
Research Project and others [7]. These projects represent a public-resource 
computing that relies on personal computers with excess capacity, such as 
idle CPU time, to resolve some complex research problems. Public-resource 
computing is an aspect of the peer-to-peer paradigm, even if it uses a grid 
technology to realize its tasks. Currently, such systems approach a DHT 
nature. Some steps of computational processes become completely 
independent from central servers: calculations results of some node are stored 
in the network and retrieved by a successor that use them for its own part of 
the task; if a peer leaves a network while processing a work unit, the work 
unit is eventually sent to another peer that becomes responsible for it (like in 
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DHT data storage systems when a node becomes responsible for resources of 
some failed node if their identifiers are considered as the closest to each 
other). 
Another type of systems that use DHT principles are collaborative 
applications for data storage and editing by several geographically distant 
work groups. Such systems should provide a rapid and secure data exchange 
between different system units and possibility of team-work in real-time and 
transparent mode.  
The systems described above represent active distributed collaborative 
environments, where every interaction between peers is important and, as    
L. Lamport said, “the failure of a computer you didn't even know existed can 
render your own computer unusable”. So, in these systems a number of 
successful downloads cannot be a sufficient instrument for reputation 
management. In collaborative environments it is also very important to 
consider possible risks and various parameters regarding the community 
context (number of lookup requests without response, number of join and 
leaves for a node, off-line status time), because the cost of a mistake, caused 
by a malicious activity in such systems is incomparably higher than in file-
sharing networks. Just some unreliable peers that have not been discarded 
form routing tables in time can interrupt a long chain of calculations. 
In the next section we present a detailed analysis of applicability of several 
existent reputation evaluation techniques as protection from some types of 
attacks in P2P networks based on DHTs. The analyzed techniques are not 
designed for DHT-based environment, so none of them represents a universal 
solution for such systems. At the same time, different reputation management 
instruments used by these techniques could be a quite effective in some 
particular cases in a DHT environment. These techniques give the possibility 
to evaluate the community context parameters mentioned above. 
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4.3 Applicability analysis of some 
reputation management techniques  
Here we briefly describe some distributed trust and reputation management 
techniques, underlining some specific characteristics and mechanisms. Then, 
the possibility of application of these techniques to the DHT-based  P2P 
environment is analyzed. 
4.3.1 Supporting Trust in Virtual Communities and 
Fuzzy Model for Context- dependent Reputation 
These two models propose relatively simple solutions regarding the 
reputation data management. Both of them have a possibility to provide 
recommendations.  
In the first case [1] the trustworthiness of recommendations is defined by the 
“semantic distance” between the recommendation provided by some entity 
and other entity’s own perception of the recommender’s trustworthiness.  So,  
the “semantic distance” is a value applied  to a recommendation  (that may be 
subjective or lying) to obtain possibly realistic information based on one’s 
own opinion of a recommender.  
In the second case [9] we don’t have a mechanism for evaluation of the 
trustworthiness of recommendations, but they can be expressed with different 
“levels of certainty”. A recommender can be absolutely sure of  the future 
behaviour of a recommended entity or can have some doubts about it, and 
this technique gives him the possibility to express it.  Moreover, in this model 
the behaviour of a recommended entity affects (in a balanced and perfectly 
symmetric mode) the reputation of the recommender. So, the network 
presents a particular community, where each entity is responsible in some 
degree for events that take place here. 
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4.3.2 PeerTrust 
PeerTrust [10] presents the most complete model among all the analyzed 
techniques. It takes in consideration a lot of parameters of great importance 
to calculate a reputation value: feedbacks and the trustworthiness of entities 
realizing them; transactions and conditions in which they are executed; 
community and environment context. The “weight” of each of these 
parameters in evaluation of the reputation of a single node can be modified 
depending on the situation, and this possibility render this model more 
flexible than others. The solutions regarding the algorithm for calculation of 
the trustworthiness level propose mechanisms of defence against malicious 
behaviour of some nodes who:  
• provide good services, but compile feedbacks incorrectly to confuse 
other peers;   
• due to collaboration with other malicious peers gain a high 
reputation value according to feedbacks provided by the malicious 
“allies”.  
This technique propose to peers an incentive to make them compile 
feedbacks correctly, assigning to “good” nodes a corresponding  recompense. 
There is another very important feature of PeerTrust that helps to cope with 
concomitant problems of dynamic character of P2P environment: the peers 
should keep in consideration feedbacks obtained during some predefined 
time interval. Then, comparing the information received in different intervals 
of time, it is possible to find out the peers with inconsistent behaviour. 
4.3.3 Personalized Trust Model (PET) 
PET [11] has two main particularities in respect of other techniques analyzed:  
1. recommendations play a very modest role in calculation of the trust 
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value, and all of them have the same level of importance and 
trustworthiness. It is explained by the fact that an entity, considered 
as trusted by some peer, is not automatically considered as trusted 
by another peer; 
2. the highest priority is assigned to direct experiences of the peers,  
that undoubtedly provide the highest level of certainty. 
The incidence of these components in the analysis concerning trustworthiness 
of a single peer is modifiable, but anyway, the incidence of the 
recommendations shouldn’t exceed 20%. 
This technique also involves mechanisms to resolve the problems caused by 
the dynamic character of peers. Here, like in PeerTrust, it is proposed to 
analyze information received from other peers (feedbacks, recommendations) 
at stated intervals. This model can be quite efficient in environments, where 
peers’ status is particularly dynamic, and the great part of them is unreliable. 
4.3.4 Poblano 
Poblano [12] is a distributed trust model created by JXTA developers, that 
proposes solutions, which are completely diverse from those we have just 
described. Here, the analysis is focused on the trust based on interests of 
different peer groups. Discussing the precedent techniques, we always 
considered such aspects as “honesty” and reliability of single peers, 
trustworthiness of their recommendations, but we didn’t take in consideration 
the quality of available resources. In this case, the trust relationships are 
established on the base of quality evaluation of data (resources) provided by 
users (peers). It is important to note, that each peer evaluates the data 
representing its sphere of interests, associated with some specific Codat. 
Codat is defined as a unit of information (that can present either code or data) 
shared and exchanged within a single peer group. So, in Poblano the 
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evaluation of the reputation of some single node is implemented on the base 
of quality of resources provided by this node.  
An algorithm of calculation of the trust value proposed in this technique,  
takes in consideration not only the original quality of a resource provided by 
a certain node, but it regards also the quality of the path the resource has gone 
through before being read by a requestor node.    
In the context of data authentication, this model involves some principles 
of “Web of Trust” conception and use of certificates, both those self-signed 
and signed by Certification Authority. 
4.3.5 NICE 
The characteristic that makes NICE [13] unique in respect of other 
techniques consists in the following: at the end of an interaction each peer 
creates a cookie, where it registers a level of its satisfaction of the 
transaction’s results, signs it, and then the signed cookies are exchanged by 
the interaction’s participants. But the cookies can contain either positive or 
negative estimations. In the case of  the positive estimation the cookies are 
exchanged by interacting peers as noted above, and each of them saves these 
cookies as a proof of its high reputation.  In the case of negative estimation 
they are retained by the peers that create it. 
So, when a peer requests for a certain resource from another peer, that it has 
interacted with before, it presents the provider with a cookie signed by the 
provider itself. The provider peer verifies its own signature and accepts the 
cookie as a proof of the requestor’s trustworthiness. If the peers have never 
interacted before, the requestor should find a “path of trust” between itself 
and the provider, and presents this path instead of a “direct cookie”. Another 
very important characteristic of NICE is the establishment of a solid 
cooperation between “good” peers in order to isolate malicious peers. 
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4.3.6 XREP 
XREP [14] proposes a model, where each peer has its experience repository, 
that contains information about the quality of the resources and the 
trustworthiness of other peers, that it has directly interacted with before. 
Once a needed resource has been individuated, a peer initiates a “vote 
process” involving all peers, that have had a direct experience regarding a 
certain resource and can present the corresponding information registered in 
their repositories. In this way, the requestor has the possibility to compare 
opinions of all these peers and then to make its own conclusion about the 
trustworthiness level of this peer.  
The main disadvantage of this technique is a great number of messages the 
peers exchange with each other during the vote process. 
4.3.7 Sporas and Histos 
These are very similar models [15], based on a quite simple mechanism. 
Anyway, both of them offer to each peer the possibility to analyze data 
received at stated time intervals and even to personalize these intervals. 
Moreover, peers can differentially evaluate opinions about behaviour of other 
peers, taking in consideration the reputation of the authors of these opinions.  
In some degree it is possible to consider Histos as evolution of an algorithm 
defined in Sporas. Histos exploits relations between peers, that already have 
been evaluated, to provide an estimation mostly personalized. 
4.3.8 Beta Reputation System 
This technique [16] is entirely based on the statistical theory and uses 
probability density function beta as a key instrument. Originally this model 
was created for a system with a more centralized character, but it is possible 
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to adapt it in decentralized systems too, but it is easier to realize this model in 
decentralized environment with some elements of centralization. Anyways, 
this technique consists of different blocks, that can be utilized and combined 
according  to certain requirements.  
Beta Reputation System supports such mechanisms as: management and 
analysis of feedbacks from multiple sources; differential evaluation of 
opinions about peers and their resources provided by other peers; data 
analysis at stated personalized time intervals. 
4.3.9 Debit-Credit Reputation Computation (DCRC) 
and Credit-Only Reputation Computation (CORC) 
These techniques [17] propose a partially distributed solution, that involves 
the presence of special peers called “reputation computation agents” (RCA). 
These agents periodically calculate and validate “points” assigned to different 
peers during their interaction with other peers. These points represent so 
called “reputation score”. So, RCAs determine and “formalize” a reputation 
value of each peer. The points is derived from credits assigned to peers when 
they implement activities useful for the community: elaboration and 
forwarding of queries, providing resources and remaining on-line for a long 
time.  
The debits (in DCRC) reduce the points and it takes place when peers 
download resources provided by other peers of the network. Each peer 
generates a couple of keys (private and public) and registers it at the RCA 
host. The digest of public keys is used by the RCAs to identify a peer. 
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4.3.10  Summary 
The summary table below contains data regarding all the basic characteristics 
of the analyzed reputation models. 
Concerning the first applicability criterion, almost all the analyzed techniques 
can be subsumed under the reputation based category. NICE and 
DCRC/CORC realize some credential and policy elements: digital signatures 
of cookies in NICE, peer identification by “reputation computation agents” 
(RCAs) using public key in DCPC/CORC. Poblano and XREP also involve 
some mechanisms with a centralized nature. This fact represents some 
difficulties for application of these techniques to completely distributed 
DHT-based networks. 
As to the second criterion, all these techniques have different completeness 
degrees. PeerTrust and Fuzzy Model represent the most complete techniques, 
as they realize almost all possible mechanisms for evaluation of a peer’s 
trustworthiness.  
We can conclude that none of these techniques in its pure form represents a 
suitable solution for DHT-based P2P networks. At the same time, different 
reputation management instruments used by these techniques could be a quite 
effective in some particular cases in DHT environments. So, in the next 
section we propose a way to exploit advantages of single mechanisms 
provided by different reputation management models.   
 
 
 
 
54 
S
ecurity in D
H
T
-based P
eer-to-P
eer netw
orks  
Credential 
and policy 
elements 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Incentive to 
feedback 
compilations 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Community 
context 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Transaction 
consideration 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes³ 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Responsibility for 
the behaviour of 
recommended 
entities 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Possibility to 
“weigh” 
recommen-
dations  
Yes 
Yes² 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes² 
Yes² 
No 
Providing 
recommen-
dations 
Yes 
Yes¹ 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes4 
Yes6 
Yes¹ 
Yes¹ 
No 
Reputation 
Value Scale 
4 possible 
levels 
Normalized 
from 0 to 1 
Normalized 
from 0 to 1 
Normalized 
from 0 to 1 
6 possible 
levels [-1; 4] 
Normalized 
from 0 to 1 
Binary 5 
From 0 to 3000 
exclusive 
Normalized 
from 0 to 1 
Non- negative 
             Parameter      
 
Model 
Supporting Trust in 
Virtual Communities 
Peer Trust 
Personalized Trust  
model 
Fuzzy Model 
Poblano 
NICE 
XREP 
Sporas and Histos 
Beta 
DCRC/CORC 
  1 –  feedbacks compiled by other users                                      3 – only the events’ number is considered                                                   5 -  a binary value scale is not obligatory 
  2 –  regards an entity compiling a feedback         4 – recommendations regarding  some determined peer                             6 – in the form of a vote 
 
 Trust and reputation management in DHT-based P2P environment 55 
4.4 Combination of different 
reputation mechanisms for the trust 
management in DHT-based P2P 
environment 
The solution we propose is a combination of different instruments for 
reputation management offered by the analyzed techniques: each of these 
instruments should be applied when it is considered as the most efficient one 
for a certain situation. In this section we present a possible scenario of 
application of the proposed solution to a P2P network based on Kademlia 
DHTs, extracting some reputation evaluation instruments from the models 
analyzed before and adapting them to particularities of DHT-based 
environment. 
4.4.1 Preliminary remarks 
As an environment for our scenario we chose a network based on Kademlia 
DHT protocol that is widely used by a number of P2P platforms (eDonkey, 
BitTorrent, etc). Taking in consideration that in Kademlia lookups are 
implemented in iterative mode, we can describe the following model of 
integration of reputation mechanisms and lookup processes: 
• each node of the network after every contact with another node 
assigns a new reputation value to the contacted peer depending on 
the interaction results; 
• all the assigned reputation values are to be stored by the querying 
node and should be consulted before contacting corresponding 
nodes again; 
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• these reputation values are used as recommendations that each node 
exchanges with others, sending them with the corresponding IP 
addresses that indicate the next step of iterative lookup. 
The proposed combination of the reputation instruments includes: 
• risk evaluation method provided by PET model [11]; 
• resources and servent repositories from XREP model [14]; 
• debit-credit based reputation computation model (DCRC) [17].  
The proposed scenario represents a situation in which a peer joins a network 
the first time and initiates a lookup process for a data file with a certain ID. 
Since it is a new node for this network, it has no idea about trustworthiness of 
other nodes. 
4.4.2 Realization details of the proposed solution 
As reputation is an accumulative value, it is not possible for a newcomer to 
evaluate someone’s reputation after the first contact. However, it is possible 
to define a level of vulnerability of the network environment on the base of 
results of the first experiences using the appropriate instrument offered by 
PET.  
PET model derives the trustworthiness value T  from two components: 
reputation factor 
eR  and risk factor iR  with different weights (incidence) 
eR
W and 
iR
W  respectively.  The trustworthiness value is defined as follows: 
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where α=
eR
W  and  α−= 1
iR
W , and the values of T,
eR  and iR are all 
from 0 to 1.  
So, in our scenario 
iRT = , as the node doesn’t have sufficient data to 
evaluate the reputation factor, but it is necessary for it to define a level of 
vulnerability of the network it has joined. The risk value in PET model is 
calculated by the formula: 
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where G, B, N, L are four levels of quality (Q) of services provided by a peer 
(it is applicable to any type of interaction between peers - elaboration and 
forwarding of queries during a lookup process, providing resources, etc.): 
G – Good, 
L – Low Grade, 
N – No Response, 
B – Byzantine Behaviour; 
iN is the number of services (interactions) provided with quality i; h  is a 
map function from Q to a score for one  interaction between nodes, i.e. it 
shows how many reputation points a node has gained or lost at the end of one 
interaction: 
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So, we can see that misbehaving reduces a reputation value faster than a good 
behaviour increases it. No Response is considered as a bad behaviour here. It 
helps to avoid too frequent and long leaving in P2P networks: it is not 
convenient for a peer to be off-line for a long period, because all requests 
sent to the node during its absence will rest without response, significantly 
reducing its reputation. It is explained by a high importance of the 
cooperation component for collaborative environments: a node that doesn’t 
participate in routing and lookup mechanisms by processing and forwarding 
requests from other nodes cannot be positively evaluated by the community. 
The risk value is normalized to the worst case, that represents a situation 
when all services received by a peer in a certain time interval are Byzantine 
services. In our example we assign to S1, S2, S3 and S4 the values 1, -2, -3 
and -4 respectively.   
In Kademlia, identifiers of nodes consist of 160 bit. Here we present a 
simplified model of Kademlia’s binary tree with a little number of sub-trees 
and leaves.   
As shown in figure 4.1, the node with prefix 0011 initiates the process of 
look-up for some resource, sending FIND_VALUE RPC to two nodes 
residing in two different sub-trees with prefixes 0111 and 1011. 
The first node doesn’t respond (the one-directional dashed arrow). The 
second node returns a triple <IP address, UDP port, Node ID> for the node 
1101. Applying the look-up progress verification mechanism, the requestor 
concludes that the Node ID sent by the second node is really closer to the 
key. 
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Fig.4.1. Look-up process based on Kademlia algorithm in terms of PET 
model 
 
According to PET model our requestor assigns to this contact the quality 
value G, and to the first contact – the value N. Then, it sends FIND_VALUE 
RPC to node 1101, that returns a triple containing Node ID 1110, but with a 
little delay. In its turn, 1110 replies with Node ID 11110, that stores the 
desired data. 11110 returns the stored value. Having controlled at each step 
the look-up progress, the requestor assigns to nodes 1101, 1110 and 11110 
the quality values L, G and G respectively. 
The risk value in our case is: 
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Information, regarding the quality of resources and the reliability of the peers 
obtained during this look-up process, should be stored in the resource and 
servent repositories [14]. 
The repositories represent two tables with the following data structures: 
• resource_ id, value; 
• servent_id, num_plus, num_minus.  
XREP’s authors don’t precise a type of data representing quality values, and 
leave for us a liberty of interpretation: it may be a numeric value, or it may be 
simply defined as good or bad.   
The data of a servent repository contain IDs of contacted peers and 
corresponding numbers of successful and unsuccessful transactions 
effectuated with these peers. As in our case we use DCRC model, it makes 
sense to substitute the num_plus and num_minus with data regarding the total 
number of uploaded and downloaded megabytes of content for a certain peer, 
e.g. mb_up and mb_down.  
To calculate the QRC parameter, for each contacted node the total number of 
queries addressed to a node and a number of queries processed and forwarded 
by a node should be stored. Adapting the data structure of the servent 
repository to our case, we have: 
<servent_id, mb_up, mb_down, num_query, num_reply>. 
Since the information of the resource repository is not used in further 
calculations, in our case it is optional. Possibility of supporting both 
repositories depends on memory resources a peer has at disposal. Having 
downloaded the desired resource, the node 0011 stores the following data in 
its servent repository: 
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servent_id   mb_up   mb_down   num_query  num_reply 
    0111      0       0  1        0 
    1011      0       0  1        1  
    1101      0       0  1        1  
    1110        0       0  1        1 
    11110      20       0  1        1 
In terms of technical realization this mechanism represents a quite simple 
solution: a simple counter seems to be sufficient.  
According to DCRC model [19], a reputation value of a peer is defined by 
credits it gains or loses during a certain period interacting with other peers. 
The total number of reputation points is calculated by the following formula: 
                          ∑ ∑ ×+×−×+×=
l m
ll SCdDDcUCbQRaN
               (4.4) 
where, QR is the number of points gained by a node for each processed 
query;  a is the total number of queries processed by a peer; b is the number 
of uploads facilitated by a peer; c is the number of downloads performed by a 
peer; d is the predefined time factor (in hours) that determines a time interval 
during which the described interactions have been performed; 
lUC and mDD  
are the upload credit and download debit for files l and m respectively. 
In its turn the UC is defined as follows: 
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where: s is the size of an uploaded file (in megabytes); bw is the bandwidth 
available (in megabytes); f is the file size factor that determines how many 
megabytes of data transfer increases the reputation score by a unit; b is the 
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bandwidth factor that classifies peers on the base of bandwidths they have at 
disposal.  
The DD for a download of a resource of size s is given by: 
                                             
b
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f
s
DD i×=                                              (4.6) 
where 
ibw  is the bandwidth of a peer i from which a download is performed. 
The Sharing Credit (SC) for a peer that shares n files during some predefined 
time interval is given by: 
                                                ∑=
n
j
j
f
s
SC                                               (4.7) 
where, js  is the size of jth file. 
Let’s calculate the reputation value of the node 11110 using the data stored 
by 0011 at the repository after the considered look-up process. Let the size s 
of the file downloaded by the node 0011 from 11110 be 20 MB, the file size 
factor  f =2MB, the available bandwidth bw = 6MB, and the bandwidth factor 
b = 2MB. Then, the UC of  11110 after this interaction is: 
30
2
6
2
20
=×=UC
 
For simplicity, let the number of points gained by a peer for each query 
processed QR=1. Let’s suppose that the total size of the resources shared by 
11110 node is 500 MB and the predefined time interval is 1 hour. Hence,  
SC=250. 
Then, at a=1 and DD=0, the total number of reputation points gained by the 
peer 11110 after the interaction in question is: 
281=+−+= tottottottot SCDDUCQRCR . 
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4.4.3 Findings 
We can conclude that, the risk calculation method used in PET model helps 
to define a level of vulnerability of an unfamiliar environment, while DCRC 
technique represents a an objective method of reputation evaluation based on 
points gained by a peer due to its collaboration with the community. In its 
turn, the repository mechanism is a simple and efficient solution for 
systematization of the data necessary for reputation points calculation. 
All of these instruments can by easily adapted to DHT-based environment. 
This example demonstrates that the mechanisms used in our scenario 
successfully complement each other, even if they have been “extracted” from 
three different reputation evaluation models. 
As is clear from the described scenario, the proposed solution represents an 
individual mechanism of reputation management for a single peer based on 
its own experience. However, as it has been discussed before, the reputation 
evaluation cannot be defined as complete and objective without taking in 
consideration opinions of other members of the community. For example, in 
the case of inconsistent behaviour of malevolent peers, it is very difficult to 
reveal the presence of malicious activity for some peers  without opportune 
warning messages from “already attacked” peers. 
So, it is necessary for peers to interact with each other and to share their 
personal opinions in order to define the trustworthiness level of a certain 
member of the community.  
The communication between peers in DHT-based P2P networks should be 
based on some opportune interaction algorithm that : 
• doesn’t require introduction of centralization elements into the 
system; 
• doesn’t cause the exceeding increase of data traffic; 
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• uses as few computational resources as possible.   
In this work we propose to integrate the classical algorithm for reaching 
Byzantine Agreement (BA) [18] and some reputation mechanisms designed 
for P2P networks based on DHTs in order to obtain a simpler and efficient 
reputation management algorithm for the completely distributed P2P 
environment that respects the above requirements. BA algorithms are 
currently used in distributed computer systems to cope with Byzantine 
Generals Problem (Interactive Consistency Problem) that provokes Byzantine 
failure. 
Particularities of the proposed integration and the obtained algorithm are 
provided in the next section. 
4.5 Byzantine Agreement for 
Reputation Management in DHT-based 
Peer-to-Peer Networks 
4.5.1 Byzantine Generals Problem in distributed 
computer systems: history of the problem 
Byzantine Generals Problem [18] (also known as Interactive Consistency 
Problem) takes place in distributed computer systems in the presence of 
malfunctioning components that give conflicting information to other parts of 
the system. It causes a Byzantine failure, that may consist in: 
• failure to pass to the next step in the algorithm;  
• system's inability to correctly implement the actual algorithm;  
• arbitrary execution of a step different from one predicated by the 
 Trust and reputation management in DHT-based P2P environment 65 
algorithm (incorrect hops). 
Originally, BGP is a problem about an agreement between generals of the 
Byzantine army, that must take a common decision: to attack or not to attack 
an enemy army? The generals are geographically distant from one another 
and they have to communicate with each other only through messengers. This 
situation is complicated by the presence of traitors among the generals. The 
traitors try to confuse loyal generals, sending them a false information about 
decisions of other generals, and moreover, they may do it in an arbitrary 
manner, i.e. different loyal generals receive different false information. 
This problem was formulated by L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease in 
1982, who were the first to apply the concept of BGP to distributed computer 
systems.  
They presented several solutions and algorithms for reaching agreement 
between system units in the presence of failed components. It has been 
proved that, assuming the possibility of sending messages directly to each 
other by all generals, there must exist some round-by-round algorithm of 
information exchange, equal for all generals, so, that: 
• all generals make the final decisions;  
• all loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action;  
• this final plan of loyal generals must coincide with final decision of 
one loyal general at least. 
Oral message-based (OM(m)) and signed message-based (SM(m)) algorithms 
have been proposed. The former allows loyal generals (system components) 
to reach agreement in the presence of t traitors only if the total number of 
generals is 3t+1 at least. The latter works for any number of generals and 
possible traitors.  
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The algorithms for BA presented by Lamport, Shostak and Pease are quite 
simple but expensive in both the amount of time and the number of messages 
sent by participants.  
Later, a number of “faster” and “lighter” algorithms for reaching agreement 
have been proposed at different times by different researchers. Developers of 
these algorithms used diverse approaches including deterministic, 
randomized and quantum principles, applying them to synchronous and 
asynchronous computational models and different types of adversaries (fail-
stop, Byzantine, etc.). 
Typical quality measures for a BA protocol are the total number of 
processors, the number of communication rounds, and its communication 
complexity, alternatively given by the maximal message size, or the total 
number of transmitted bits. The known lower bounds are, respectively,          
n > 3t, t+1, 1, and n (t+1)/4 [19]. 
Algorithm presented by M.Rabin and M. Ben-Or in 1983 [20,21] use 
principles of randomness and probability, and significantly reduce the 
number of necessary rounds in respect of the solution by Lamport et al.   
Later, Lewis and Saia presented a new scalable protocol for BA [22] which is 
very similar to Rabin's one, but they proposed to use random sampling: in 
each round each processor takes input from a small random sample of all the 
other processors, in distinction from Rabin's protocol, in which a processor 
takes input from all other processors in each round. This algorithm was 
created for those types of distributed computer systems where the direct 
communication network components with each other is not realizable 
because of their great quantity. This solution reduces the number of messages 
exchanged by nodes. The authors say that their protocol can tolerate any 
fraction of faulty processors which is strictly less than 1/6. The protocol is 
correct only with high probability and involves simultaneously all the 
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components of the network. 
In 2005 M. Ben-Or and A. Hassidim proposed a fast quantum Byzantine 
agreement protocol [23], that reaches agreement in O(1) expected 
communication rounds against a strong full information, dynamic adversary 
in the presence of up to t < n/3 faulty participants in synchronous setting, and 
up to t < n/4 faulty participants for asynchronous setting. This solution 
consists in postponing coin flips and using quantum superposition. 
In 1998 J. Garay and Y. Moses presented a fully polynomial deterministic 
protocol for reaching Byzantine agreement in t + 1 rounds for n > 3t 
processors (where t is an a priori upper bound on the number of faulty 
processors possible) [24]. For the moment it is the shortest deterministic 
algorithm executable with the minimal number of processors and in the 
minimal number of rounds. 
Currently, Byzantine Agreement is a central problem in fault-tolerant 
distributed computing and secure multi-party computation, and it abstracts 
out a variety of situations where conflicting parties must coordinate their 
decisions and cooperate towards achieving a common goal.  
4.5.2 Applicability of classical solutions for BGP to 
P2P environment 
In DHT-based P2P networks malevolent peers exploit routing mechanisms to 
trouble reliable communication between nodes and to break down consistent 
operation of the network. So, the analogy between the behaviour of malicious 
nodes in P2P networks and actions of traitorous components in the case of 
Byzantine failure is obvious. Byzantine behaviour in P2P environment 
manifests in different types of attacks, such as incorrect lookup routing, 
incorrect routing updates, etc. 
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So, it is possible to apply some classical solutions developed for distributed 
computer systems to cope with some types of malicious activity in DHT-
based P2P networks. 
Let’s consider an example of application of classical solutions for BGP to the 
case of incorrect routing updates. In this example we present a situation with 
a small number of participating nodes. A malicious node in the considered 
case demonstrates poor behaviour regarding all other nodes (e.g. doesn’t 
behave in an inconsistent manner). 
To update information about keys of resources and the identifiers of 
appropriate responsible nodes in routing tables, peers should exchange 
information they have with each other. So, each node sends to others a list of 
keys of resources it is responsible for. The loyal peers send the real 
information to other nodes, and the traitors may send different information to 
each node.  
Let’s say, the first node (peer) sends to others the list of keys in the form of 
vector N1 consisting of binary numbers of a fixed length that present 
resource identifiers. The second node sends vector N2; the third sends three 
different vectors X, Y and Z to node 1, node 2 and node 3 respectively, the 
fourth node sends vector N4 to all of them. Then, they exchange the received 
information with each other in accordance with oral message-based algorithm 
OM(m) for BA. The traitor sends arbitrary values to all other peers again.  
Hence, after this data exchange, each peer can form its matrix on the base of 
the information received.  The element nij of each matrix represents a vector 
that node i received from node j. So, in our case we have the following 
matrixes: 
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As we can see, in each matrix there are one row and one column containing 
values different from other cells, and these values are sent by the third peer. 
So, the peers update their routing tables with the values received from the 
majority of peers. In this case the application of the OM(m) algorithm is quite 
efficient. 
However, in a real P2P network the application of the classical solutions for 
BGP in their pure form is complicated by some specific aspects regarding the 
nature of P2P. These systems represent an environment with a great number 
of participants, where nodes join and leave the network continuously. So, a 
P2P network cannot be considered as a static system where each component 
can contact directly all others at any moment. But in accordance with 
interactive consistency conditions [18], each participant of the algorithm 
should have the possibility to directly contact all others. 
  N1 N2 X N4   N1 N2 X N4 
P1 = N1 N2 Y N4 P2 = N1 N2 Y N4 
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  N1 N2 Z N4   N1 N2 Z N4 
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Moreover, as already mentioned above, the solutions presented by Lamport et 
al are expensive from the point of view of time spent and the number of 
messages sent by nodes. In fact, to reach an agreement the number of rounds 
executed  must be linear in the total number of participating components. The 
algorithms (OM(m) and SM(m)) require message paths of length up to t + 1 
(where t is a number of traitors).  Thus, the total number of messages that 
nodes send to each other to reach an agreement is: 
                 (n - 1)(n – 2) ... (n – t – 1) = (n – 1)! /(n – t – 2)!                   (4.8) 
i.e., there is a factorial-like dependence between the number of messages and 
the number of nodes. In P2P environment it implies sending an exceedingly 
massive amount of messages and, as a result, the overload of the network. 
So, to apply the solutions for Byzantine failure to P2P systems we should 
find a way to reduce the data traffic load on the network during execution of 
the BA algorithm. 
Taking in consideration that the algorithms by Lamport et al are effective for 
small groups of participants, it makes sense to present a P2P network as a 
number of peer groups. In this case each node launches the algorithm only 
within a group it belongs to, and the total number of messages sent by 
network nodes is: 
    Nm = ((ni - 1)(ni – 2) ... (ni – ti – 1))× k     (4.9) 
where ni - the average number of nodes in one group; ti -  the average number 
of traitors in one group; k - the number of groups in the network. 
The diagrams (Fig.1 and Fig.2) show that the number Nm of messages 
decreases with increase of the number of groups k, at various network sizes 
(number of nodes in the network N = 100; 1000; 10000; 100000; 1000000), 
for the cases when the number of traitors on the network is t = 1/5N and t = 
1/3N (the  worst case).   
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Fig.4.2 Diagrams of Nm change at k increased for t = 1/5N 
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Fig. 4.3 Diagrams of Nm change at k increased for t = 1/3N 
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So, the problem of overload can be resolved applying the solutions for BGP 
to small groups of peers. Here emerges the following question: how can peer 
groups be created and individuated?      
The network may be divided into subgroups in many senses, such as: a group 
of the most frequent contacts, a group of neighbour nodes with ''close'' 
identifiers according to the XOR-metric, groups of peers with common 
interests, etc. However, the listed principles of “peers clustering” are hardly 
realizable in P2P networks because of particularly dynamical nature of this 
environment explained by continuous joins and leaves. These principles 
suppose creating groups that are stable in terms of time and membership, but 
it is not possible in P2P. For instance, in DHT-based networks the identifier 
of a node that has just left the network can be assigned to a node that will join 
it in the next moment.  
It is also important to note, that in our example we deal with the malicious 
peer who demonstrates poor behaviour toward all other nodes. In the case of 
inconsistent behaviour it is not so easy to detect the presence of malicious 
activity. When a malicious peer is more “cunning” and sends the real values 
to one part of the nodes, and to other part of them sends some arbitrary 
values,  it becomes possible to consider one of the right values as false. Thus, 
in the case of inconsistent behaviour application of reputation evaluation 
mechanisms integrated with the above solutions makes sense.  
Thus, the goal of our research is to find a solution that exploits the simplicity 
and the effectiveness of BA protocol and at the same time can be easily 
adapted to the dynamic and distributed nature of P2P, in order to cope with 
some effects of specific attacks of DHT-based environment. 
In the next section we describe some mechanisms and techniques that we 
propose to integrate in order to achieve this goal. 
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4.5.3 Algorithms and techniques involved in the 
proposed solutions 
As a starting point we take EigenTrust algorithm [25] and modify it replacing 
some mechanisms with the techniques listed below, but keeping some 
original features unchanged. In particular the algorithm we propose uses the 
following instruments: 
• “score managers” from EigenTrust;  
• concept of responsible nodes (primary tier) from OceanStore 
distributed data storage system [26]; 
• algorithm for reaching agreement based on oral messages OM(m) by 
Lamport et al [18]. 
Let’s consider each of these instruments in details. 
We start from EigenTrust [25] algorithm for reputation management that is 
designed specifically for DHT-based P2P environment.  
EigenTrust assigns each peer a unique global trust value based on a peer’s 
history of uploads. The global trust value assigned to some peer i reflects the 
experiences of all peers in the network regarding peer i. This algorithm is 
based on the following statements: 
• self-policing of the system; 
• anonymity of peers; 
• no profit to newcomers; 
• minimal overhead in terms of computation, infrastructure, storage 
and message complexity; 
• resilience to alliances of malicious peers.  
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The trust value of a peer in this system is computed by a responsible group 
of M peers called score managers. Score managers for a peer are located by 
applying a set of one-way secure hash functions to a unique ID of the peer 
(e.g. IP address) and searching for nodes that can be responsible for 
theobtained key (those with the IDs closest to the key in the identifier space). 
Since each node in the network acts as a score manager, it is assigned a set 
of daughters Di represented by indexes of peers whose trust values are 
computed by this peer.  
When a score manager leaves the network it passes all stored trust values 
to its neighbour peer in accordance with DHT data distribution principles. 
Another mechanism we use for our solution is the concept of the “primary 
tier” nodes proposed by authors of OceanStore distributed data storage 
system [26]. In OceanStore privileged nodes of the “primary tier” cooperate 
with one another through a BA protocol to take a decision about a final 
commit order for an update generated by some node of the “secondary tier”. 
The BA algorithm is launched on the base of an update request received from 
the initiator of the update. Once the agreement is reached primary nodes send 
the result to all interested secondary nodes. 
In this case the classical solutions for BGP are efficient due to the small 
number of the algorithm’s participants. However, here we deal with a 
hierarchical model where nodes of the primary tier represent a sort of central 
authority. The static set of privileged nodes contradicts the completely 
distributed nature of DHT-based P2P environment.  
So, we propose to exploit the mechanism of score managers used by 
EigenTrust algorithm to define a group of responsible nodes. In this case, 
responsible nodes are assigned randomly (by a set of M hash-functions) and 
they are changed in course of time.  
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At the same time, we modify secure EigenTrust algorithm introducing the use 
of a BA protocol by score managers. Executing a BA algorithm score 
managers take a common decision about what trust value is to be reported 
when some peer requests information about a trustworthiness of another peer 
they are responsible for. As a BA algorithm in our solution we apply the 
classical oral message-based OM(m) algorithm by Lamport et al. This choice 
is made to avoid complications inherent to signed message-based techniques. 
4.5.4 Reputation evaluation algorithm with use of 
Byzantine Agreement protocol 
Preliminary remarks 
Before describing the modified algorithm, it is necessary  to set the 
following assumptions. 
• Let Nk ∈  be a fixed value that defines the maximum number of trust 
values that a peer can report to its score managers.  So, a local trust 
vector sent by peer d to its score manager i ki
dc ]1;0[∈ . 
• The oral message-based algorithm OM(m) for reaching agreement is 
applied instead of the iterative calculation of trust values used in 
Eigen Trust. 
• Normalized trust values will be used as in EigenTrust. 
• Each peer has M score managers, whose DHT coordinates are 
defined by applying a set of hash functions 
1||10 ,...,, −Mhhh , to a peer's 
unique identifier; posi represents coordinates of peer i in the hash 
space. 
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• Since each peer also acts as a score manager it is associated with a set 
of daughter peers Di, comprising IDs of peers it is responsible for. 
Moreover, a peer stores each daughter peer's opinion vector. 
• Furthermore, for each daughter peer 
iDd ∈ , i learns 
i
dA  representing 
a set of peers which have downloaded files from its daughter peer. 
• Finally, for each 
iDd ∈ , a peer learns 
i
dB  representing a set of peers 
from which its daughter peer d has downloaded files. 
 
Description of the proposed algorithm 
As in EigenTrust, in the proposed solution each peer acts simultaneously as 
an ordinary user and as a score manager for some other peers in the network. 
Each peer i (as a user) provides score managers with its local trust vector 
ic  
that contains all local trust values cij computed by peer i regarding other 
peers j. Acting as score managers, peers process M vectors 
ic  received 
before through BA algorithm. After the algorithm has been performed, each 
score manager stores the resulting trust value. A score manager execute this 
procedure for each peer it is responsible for.  
A node that needs information about the trustworthiness of some peer i asks 
corresponding score managers at positions )(),...,( 1||0 iMi poshposh − for trust 
values they have obtained through the described algorithm. Then, it receives 
M trust values and computes the median value of the vector containing these 
values in ascending order.  
Below we provide the original secure EigenTrust Algorithm (Algorithm 1) 
and the modified reputation evaluation algorithm (Algorithm 2).  
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foreach peer i do 
submit local trust values 
ic to all score managers at positions  
)( im posh , m = 1…M-1; 
collect local trust values 
dc and sets of acquaintances 
i
dB  
of daughter peers 
iDd ∈ ; 
submit daughter d’s local trust values 
djc to  
score managers )( dm posh , m = 1…M-1,
i
dBj∈∀  
collect acquaintances i
dA of daughter peers; 
foreach daughter peer 
iDd ∈ do 
query all peers i
dAj ∈  for jjd pc ; 
repeat 
compute 
d
k
nnd
k
d
k
d
k
d aptctctcat ++++−=
+ )...)(1( )()(22
)(
11
)1(   
send )1( +k
ddjtc  to each score manager of each peer
i
dBj∈ ; 
wait for each score manager of each peer i
dAj ∈ to return 
)1( +k
jjd tc  ; 
until ε<−+ || )()1( kd
k
d tt ; 
end 
End 
Algorithm 1. Secure EigenTrust Algorithm 
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foreach peer i do: 
send ic to M score managers at positions )(),...,( 1||0 iMi poshposh − ; 
for ∀
iDd ∈  perform a BA protocol with other score managers  
in order to form a resulting vector 
BA
dc  form M values of ic    
foreach 
iDd ∈  do: 
i
dBl ∈∀  ask d for a local trust value of peer l dlc   
 send value dlc  to each score manager of peer l 
i
dAj ∈∀  wait for each score manager of peer j to return jdc  
choose by a majority vote  k values of 
jdc  
compute the mean value and get d’s trust value
dt  
end 
end 
 
Algorithm 2. Reputation Evaluation using Byzantine Agreement  protocol 
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The modified algorithm appears computationally simpler than EigenTrust, 
since it does not involve iterative calculation of trust values )(k
dt by score 
managers. However, it is necessary to estimate complexity of both 
EigenTrust and the modified algorithms to confirm our expectations. In the 
next section we provide the complexity evaluation of both algorithms in 
terms of average number of sent messages per node. 
4.5.5 Complexity evaluations of the modified and the 
previous algorithms 
At first, the following parameters should be introduced: 
• n is the total number of nodes in the network; 
• k is the maximum number of evaluations a node can report to its 
score managers; 
• M is the number of score managers per node; 
• c is the number of necessary iterations needed by EigenTrust to 
converge (typically 10). 
According to the previous definition of k and M, it can be shown that, upon 
the average, for each peer i and for each daughter peer d, |
iD |=M (if robust 
hash functions are used) and kBA id
i
d == |||| . Moreover, every message is 
assumed to have computational cost 1, regardless of differences between 
scalars and vectors. 
It is important to note that in the presented solutions the algorithm 
complexity does not depend on the total number n of nodes in the network. 
As a consequence, the number of sent messages per node is also independent 
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from the number of connected users. 
Both the algorithms described above for a single node i should be performed 
by each node in the network. So, each step of the algorithms is repeated n 
times at every round. However, while computing the average number of sent 
messages per node, the total number is divided by n, i.e. n is cancelled out of 
the calculation. 
Complexity evaluation of EigenTrust 
Let’s consider how many messages are to be sent at each step of EigenTrust. 
At the first step, sending a vector 
ic by peer i to its score managers requires 
M messages to be generated.  
Then, each score manager of peer i sends M – 1 messages to other score 
managers. It means that (M - 1)M messages are sent in total to execute this 
step of the algorithm. 
At the third step, for each 
iDd ∈ peer i: 
• asks each peer i
dAj∈  for a trust assessment of its daughter peer; 
• performs c iterations consisting of computing the trust value )(k
dt and 
sending )(k
ddjtc to each score manager of all
i
dBj∈ . Hence, kM 
messages are sent. 
Thus, the total number of messages generated at this step is  
M(k + Mkc) = M²(kc) + kM. 
So, in total, the “cost” of EigenTrust in terms of sent messages per node is: 
M + ((M – 1)M) + (M²(kc) + kM) = 
                             = M² + M²(kc) + kM = M²(kc + 1) + kM.                 (4.10) 
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Complexity evaluation of the modified algorithm 
Firstly, the number of messages exchanged by nodes during the execution of 
the BA algorithm should be calculated. It is performed at the beginning of the 
algorithm, after peer i has reported vector 
ic to its score managers. 
As we know, the number of messages exchanged in OM(t) algorithm with t 
traitors and 3t + 1generals involved is 
(n – 1)(n – 2) …(n – t – 1). 
This step of the algorithm represents a situation comparable to the case with a 
commander (peer i) sending an order (vector 
ic ) to his M lieutenants (score 
managers). In this case the total number of participants of the BA algorithm 
is M + 1. So, the number of sent messages is defined as: 
M(M – 1)…(M – t). 
To cope with t traitors,  the minimum value of M is defined so, that: 
M + 1 ≥ 3t + 1. 
Thus, M = 3t and we have: 

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Let’s set b as a number of messages sent by score managers to each other at 
this step of the algorithm in order to achieve an agreement regarding local 
trust values 
ic provided by each peer for its responsible nodes: 




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
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


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



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!
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32
!
M
M
b
. 
Then, each i’s score manager asks M score managers of each peer i
dAl ∈  for 
a value 
lic . Since kA
i
d ≈|| , the average number of sent messages at this step 
is kM. 
Hence, the complexity of the proposed algorithm in terms of messages sent is 
22
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                    (4.11) 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show how the number of sent messages per node changes 
with increase of the number of score managers at k = 100 and k =10000 
respectively. As is clear from the graphs and the equations we have provided 
before, EigenTrust has a quadratic dependence between the number of 
messages sent and the number of score managers involved, while the 
modified algorithm provides the factorial-like dependence. The latter will be 
more efficient when M is quite small or k is quite large. We can see that when 
the maximum number of values reported by a peer to its score managers is 
k∈[100, 10000] and M ≤12 (in the first case) or M ≤ 17 (in the second case) 
the modified algorithm is always “cheaper” than EigenTrust in terms of 
messages required.  
 Trust and reputation management in DHT-based P2P environment 83 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4.4  Complexity comparison between EigenTrust (ET) and the modified 
algorithm (MA) in terms of number of sent messages per  node at k=100 
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Fig.4.5 Complexity comparison between EigenTrust (ET) and the modified 
algorithm (MA) in terms of number of sent messages per  node at k=10000 
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4.5.6 Summary 
The proposed solution is less expensive in the number of messages sent per 
node in respect of the previously proposed EigenTrust algorithm. At the same 
time the use of Byzantine Agreement protocol instead of the iterative 
calculation of trust values significantly simplifies the algorithm saving 
computational and memory resources of the system.   
The mechanism of assignment of score mangers using hash functions makes 
it impossible for malicious peers to effectively cooperate and to create 
alliances in order to confuse loyal peers: malicious peers can neither know 
which nodes they are responsible for, nor choose appropriate coordinates to 
become a score manager of a certain peer. Moreover, when most of peers are 
malicious, misbehaving towards honest peers is to be considered as regular, 
because in according to the self-policing principle [6] of the system the 
shared ethics of the user population are defined and enforced by the peers 
themselves. 
To render the algorithm less expensive in the amount of time (rounds) 
required for execution it is possible to apply faster protocols for BA, such as 
that of Garay and Moses [24], instead of classical algorithms by Lamport et 
al.   
Assessing the efficiency of the modified algorithm at small values of M in 
order to evaluate the possibility of further minimization of the total number 
of messages sent will be the next step of the optimization of the proposed 
solution. 
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5 Distributed Hash Tables in 
collaborative environments 
“The two offices of memory are collection and distribution” 
Samuel Johnson  (1709-1784) 
5.1 Enterprise networks 
Computer networks has become an integral part of the technical 
infrastructure of today enterprises and play an important role in management 
of their business activity and successful realization of any type of projects. 
An enterprise network is defined as a geographically dispersed network for a 
large business enterprise, that typically comprises a number of local area 
networks (LANs), which have to interface with each other, as well as with a 
central database management system and many client workstations. Usually, 
such network has a hierarchical structure, and it is based on a client-server 
model and centralized architecture.  
An enterprise network should provide effective mechanisms for:  
• secure communication between network terminals;  
• rapid and secure data exchange between different system units;  
• reliable data storage system; 
• secure network access; 
• simple network administration.  
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Fig. 5.1Enterprise network 
It is also very important to make data, produced by some department 
maximally available for other interested entities. It should be realized in 
accordance with a predefined policy of attribution of different privileges, 
regarding data access, to users from various departments of the same 
organization.  
Recently, the possibility of collaboration between different geographically 
distant organizational units in real-time and transparent mode is 
indispensable for many enterprises. Today there are numerous groupware 
applications, that provide the opportunity of synchronous collaboration 
among distant work groups engaged in a common task via computer 
networks (for example, Groove Virtual Office). 
Currently, almost all enterprise networks as well as the groupware they 
utilize, have either a centralized architecture or a hybrid architecture based on 
the use of central servers that require high administration and maintenance 
costs. Moreover, centralized systems are subject to some problems regarding 
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information security, data retrieval efficiency and reliability, such as:  
• predisposition to “denial of service” and “packet filtering” attacks; 
• single point of failure, represented by one (or more) server, that is a 
unique network component responsible for the storage of all data 
and resources; 
• possible reduction of performance characteristics of network 
terminals in terms of bandwidth and time of access to resources, that 
takes place when a great number of clients simultaneously request 
for the access to different resources; 
• low network scalability caused by growing number of terminals and, 
as supervention, necessary augmentation of storage capacity of 
servers, that, in its turn, causes additional costs; 
• complexity of database organization; 
• high administration and maintenance costs. 
To cope with the above problems and to satisfy the requirements regarding 
effective data management and functionality of enterprise networks provided 
before it is advisable to pass from the centralized organization to a 
decentralized and distributed system. In particular, we propose to introduce a 
distributed peer-to-peer data organization system based on DHT to the 
enterprise environment.  
5.2 General description of the 
proposed approach 
The proposed approach consists in introducing a distributed peer-to-peer data 
organization system to the enterprise environment. This system exploits 
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hardware and memory resources of all terminals of the network to provide a 
reliable data storage system and the possibility of effective collaboration 
between geographically distant users. In this case all the network terminals 
together form a huge distributed disk space. Moreover, the distributed 
structure gives the possibility of incremental growth of the network, 
delivering complementary capacity when and where needed. This feature is 
very appreciable in potentially extensible environment of enterprise 
networks. 
The solution presented here is based on resource sharing and data storage 
principles inherent to peer-to-peer networks based on Distributed Hash 
Tables.  
As already mentioned above, in a DHT-based P2P system a group of 
distributed hosts collectively manage a mapping from keys to data values 
according to some predefined algorithm (CAN, Chord, Pastry, Tapestry, 
Kademlia), without any fixed hierarchy and with a very little human 
assistance. Today, a great number of P2P platforms use DHT-based overlay 
networks, that create a structured virtual topology above the basic transport 
protocol level implementing effective self-organizing data storage and lookup 
mechanisms. 
The concept of Virtual Enterprise Networks involves use of overlay 
mechanisms as well: Supernet layer with the appropriate address system is 
employed to protect data transmitted by the network layer [1]. The Supernet 
is based on communications tunnelling technique (mainly IP over IP), that is 
widely used to implement such services as multicasting, virtual private 
networks (VPN) and mobility support. Due to the Supernetworking  users of 
a “virtual” enterprise network can securely communicate with each other and 
access to the database of the enterprise to get information they need from any 
Internet access point. However, the problem of a single point of failure and 
other problems concerning the centralized network architecture are still 
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present here. 
We propose application of Kademlia DHTs to organize data storage and 
retrieval in enterprise networks. Due to the particular nature of the enterprise 
environment, it is necessary to make some modifications in Kademlia 
protocol in order to better suit several specific security requirements. 
Since most of enterprise networks exploit trustless public network 
infrastructures, it is important to provide users with appropriate data 
authenticity and access control instruments, that can guarantee secure 
communication and data exchange.  
We introduce a system of different levels of privileges based on use of prefix 
identifiers (prefix_IDs) for both nodes and resources to handle read/write 
permissions in accordance with a certain enterprise hierarchical model. This 
is realizable due to Kademlia’s tree-like structure of the identifier space. 
5.3 Kademlia for data storage and 
retrieval in enterprise networks 
5.3.1 Why Kademlia? 
Kademlia DHT has been already described in Chapter 2. Here we provide 
only a brief summary on Kademlia system. 
Kademlia is a peer-to-peer DHT based on the XOR metric. The distance 
between two identifiers is defined as: d (x,y) = x XOR y. All nodes and 
resources in this system have 160-bit identifiers (keys). The data are 
replicated by finding k (the recommended value for k is 20) nodes closest to a 
key and storing the key/value pair on them.  
Kademlia has a tree-like data structure and the routing process is 
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implemented in prefix-matching mode. The routing table size is N2log . 
Comparing the main characteristics of different DHT-based algorithms, we 
can say that Kademlia is the most appropriate system to be applied to 
enterprise networks due to the following advantages it offers: 
•   the binary tree-based structure of the identifier space and routing by 
prefix matching permit to manage the assignment of IDs to enterprise 
terminals and diverse privileges to single departments in simple and 
intuitive mode in accordance with a predefined hierarchy; 
• easy implementation of eventual algorithm modifications in the case 
of enhancement of a network’s dimensions; 
•  the symmetry of XOR-metric provides peers with a possibility to 
learn and update routing information from queries they receive 
during a lookup process; 
•  a Kademlia network can be presented as a bucket table. So, the 
lookup speed can be increased by considering b bits (instead of one 
bit) at each step, reaching a desired resource in less time. 
So, Kademlia offers all necessary mechanisms to create a flexible and 
effective overlay “infrastructure” for enterprise networks. 
5.3.2 Proposed scenario of the network organization 
Before describing the processes of publishing and modifying data stored by 
network nodes, it is necessary to explain how the new identification system is 
organized.  
Let’s consider an enterprise network of some hypothetical company. We 
suppose that our company consists of many departments of different levels 
(A, B, C), which have different privileges regarding the possibility to access 
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and modify data produced by the same department or by another one. 
According to this system of privileges, any department of level A can access 
and modify data produced only by an office of the same level. Any B 
department has more privileges than A departments: it can get and modify 
data produced by any B office and also by any office of level A. Accordingly, 
C departments are enabled to access and modify files created by departments 
of lower levels A and B, and so on. Finally there are nodes with a manager 
status (M), that can get, change, store and cancel files produced by nodes of 
any department. 
Some types of data should be accessible and shared by all the departments, 
for example administrative circulars, recommendations, instructions, etc. So, 
this information should be stored at A nodes, that belong to the lowest level 
of the described system, to provide free access to these resources for all  
nodes of the network.  
Since an enterprise network is a quite particular system with specific 
requirements regarding information security and access control mechanisms, 
it is necessary to make some appropriate modifications in Kademlia protocol 
to adapt this algorithm to such environment.  
Let’s begin from keys and node IDs assignment.   
5.3.3 Assignment of node identifiers 
Although each workstation of an enterprise network may have a static IP 
address, it is not convenient to assign to a node an identifier obtained as a 
hash function of its static IP address, because the node would get the same 
node ID every time it joins the network, and it would potentially be more 
vulnerable to masquerade attacks (a type of attack in which one system entity 
illegitimately poses as another entity to gain access to confidential data). 
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The solution we propose is a random attribution of node IDs by some trusted 
bootstrap terminal that should be contacted by nodes to join the network. In 
this case we avoid a situation when a malicious node can get and use a 
specific ID in order to possess certain keys related to confidential data.   
To organize all work processes (storage, retrieval and exchange of data) and 
interactions between network terminals in accordance with hierarchical 
principles described above, we propose a solution explained below. 
Each Kademlia node has a 160-bit node ID, that we divide in two strings of  
bits: the former is called prefix_ID, the latter is called node_ID. The prefix 
consists of β bits, and the remaining 160 - β bits represent the node_ID.  
The length of the prefix and of the node ID depends on the network 
dimensions and on the corresponding structure, i.e. on the number of nodes in 
the network and the number of different departments that an enterprise 
consists of. The prefix defines a level that a node belongs to.  
When some node contacts a bootstrap terminal, this one recognizes the level 
of privileges the node can enjoy examining its certificate, and assigns to the 
node the corresponding prefix_ID predefined for the departments of this 
level. The node_ID should be randomly generated by the bootstrap terminal, 
that also verifies that the matched pair <prefix_ID; node_ID> doesn’t 
coincide with some node that is already online. The assigned ID expires 
immediately when a node leaves the network.  
Since Kademlia system has a tree-like data structure it is quite simple to 
realize this ID assignment technique (Fig. 5.2). 
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Fig. 5.2. Assignment of IDs to the network terminals 
5.3.4 Key assignment and data storage procedures 
Regarding the key assignment to files published on the network, the 160-bit 
key ID cannot be simply calculated as hash function of the file, as it happens 
in Kademlia. In fact, in this case, the prefix-based mechanism is also needed. 
Without involving the prefixes we can have the following situation: when a 
node A is going to publish some file, it first calculates the key applying a 
hash function to the file’s content, then looks up for the nodes closest to the 
key. Since these ones may belong to departments of level B or C, the file 
could be stored at nodes of the higher level that is inaccessible for nodes of 
level A for the future modifications and use. So, in terms of files retrieval 
efficiency and according to the “competence principle” it’s more useful to 
store data using the already introduced prefix-based approach. 
In order to implement this principle, we use the same technique as for node 
IDs, dividing a key identifier in two strings of bits that represent the 
prefix_ID (the first β bits) and the key_ID (the remaining 160-β bits).  
A key_ID can be obtained applying a hash function to the file content, as it is 
implemented in Kademlia. A prefix_ID of a resource usually coincides with a 
prefix_ID of the node that produced it. So, the prefix indicates a level of 
“confidentiality” of a file’s content, i.e. if it is for common use or only for 
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limited use of certain departments. However, if a node B, for example, 
intends to make a file it has created available for all departments, it should 
store the file on some node of level A. To do it the “publisher” should assign 
to the file a prefix_ID predefined by the bootstrap for nodes of level A.  
Hence, according to Kademlia principles the file will be stored at some node 
of level A with the node_ID “closest” to the file’s key_ID. Obviously, a node 
is not permitted to store data at nodes of the level that is higher than its own 
one.  
Thus, for the efficient data retrieval, files should be stored in such mode that 
nodes, using those files frequently during a work process, could easily get 
them. This is possible only if all necessary files are hosted by nodes of the 
same or the lower level in respect of the level of a certain node. 
To illustrate the mechanisms described above we provide a simple example. 
In our example (Fig.5.3) instead of 160-bit key-space we consider 4-bit 
space, where the number of bits assigned to the prefix_ID is β = 2 and the 
other two bits represent node_ID or key_ID. All terminals represented on the 
figure are online. 
 
 
Fig 5.3. Example of data storage procedure 
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Let’s suppose that a node C needs to publish a file for internal use of 
department C with key_ID 01. In this case the node has to store the data at 
some node of level C. So the file’s ID (key) will be 1001. In this example 
there is only one node C online apart from the publisher.  
Calculating the distances between the key of our resource and IDs of the 
active nodes according to XOR-metric, we obtain the following results: 
dist(1001;1010)=0011=3 
dist(1001;1101)=0100=4 
dist(1001;0000)=1001=9 
dist(1001;0011)=1010=10 
dist(1001;0010)=1011=11 
dist(1001;0110)=1111=15. 
So, the closest nodes are: the node C with ID=1010, the Manager node 1101, 
and the node 0000 of level A.  
To avoid the problem of data storage at inappropriate nodes, the publisher 
should verify the node IDs returned by the lookup procedure and choose for 
the storage the nodes with opportune prefix_IDs. In our case the opportune 
node is C with ID=1010 of the original sub-tree. Thus, the STORE RPC 
should be sent only to nodes with IDs that satisfy the condition: 
( , ) 2ndist ID key β−< , 
where n is the total number of bits in the node ID, β is the number of bits in 
the prefix identifier.  
This inequality imposes an upper bound to the distance between a key and a 
target node. If IDs of two nodes satisfy this condition, they reside at the same 
sub-tree of the identifier space and belong to the same department (Fig. 5.4). 
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Fig. 5.4 Differentiation between peer groups in accordance with the 
proposed prefix-based identification technique at various number of bits in 
the prefix identifier β  
5.3.5 Data publication process 
Publication of data in Kademlia is implemented by storing of <key, value> 
pairs corresponding to a certain file at nodes with the IDs closest to the key.  
The flexibility of DHT algorithms provides us with two possibilities: the 
“value” can represent information about an “address” (ID) of a node where a 
file can be found and the resource’s description (metadata), as well as the file 
itself.   
Since most of the files produced and exchanged by nodes in enterprise 
environment represent different types of documentation (text, diagrams, 
tables) that usually don’t occupy a lot of disk space, the second way may be 
preferred. In this way we can use mechanisms of “integrated backup” to 
avoid situations when some node leaves the network and resources it 
possesses become unreachable for other terminals. It is realized in the 
following mode.  
A publisher defines the k closest nodes for a resource to be stored according 
to Kademlia principles. In order to rationally distribute network memory 
resources and to avoid excessive traffic increase, the “value” representing a 
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replica of the resource is stored at γ nodes from these k nodes  (γ < k). The 
rest k – γ nodes receive the STORE RPC regarding the same <key, value> 
pair, but with the “value” in the form of the file’s metadata. So, on the 
network a certain number of the replicas will be presented, and leaving of 
some of the file’s holders will not create any problem.  
Besides the limit on the number of replicas γ, it also makes sense to introduce 
size limits for files to be replicated. The files that exceed this limit can be 
stored only at the nodes of origin, and the corresponding metadata should be 
hosted by the nodes defined by XOR metric. 
To simplify the task of a publisher, we propose to apply a “tree-like data 
memorization model”. Using this model a publisher doesn’t need to send a 
<key, value> pair to all γ nodes. Instead of this, it sends the pair concerning a 
file to be stored, to two nodes that it considers the closest. In this case the 
<key, value> pair is complemented by a Time To Live (TTL) parameter such 
that: 
γ=∑
=
TTL
i
i
1
2
 
When the two closest nodes receive the STORE RPC, each of them store the 
received data and send to the node that has initialized the process a 
confirmation of the executed data storage. Then they verify that the TTL 
value is not null yet, as at each step of the process it is decremented by one. 
Hence, each of these nodes sends the new TTL value and the <key, value> 
pair to other two nodes it regards the closest to the key, and so on until TTL 
value has reached zero.  
Figure 5.5 illustrates a tree-like data memorization process for γ=6. 
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Fig.5.5 Tree-like data memorization model 
This technique of data publication represents a quite fast and reliable 
mechanism. Such model provides a uniform distribution of a resource’s 
replicas within the network. It guarantees that each node potentially 
interested in a certain file, keeps in its k-bucket at least one contact which 
possesses a replica of this file or an ID of its possessor. 
5.3.6 Modification and update of stored data 
Now, let’s consider how a node can modify some file and then publish this 
modification, making it available for remote users working on the same file 
(editing of the same document, performance of some calculations based on 
results of the previous step). Realization of this mechanism provides a 
possibility of real-time collaboration between interested users.  
A node that has modified some file should publish the updated version at a 
node from which the previous version of the file was downloaded. If the 
latter is not active at this moment, the file should be stored at some of the k 
nodes closest to the key that store the metadata or a copy of the original 
version of the file. In case of all these nodes leave the network, the updated 
file should be published in accordance with the data publication algorithm 
described above. As in the case of new data publication, the STORE RPCs 
are sent to the k closest nodes with appropriate <key, value> pairs.  
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The tree-like data memorization model is to be respected in the case of 
updates publication too. It means that once a node has published a modified 
version of some file at its node of origin, this last sends the STORE RPCs 
with replicas and metadata of the updated file to the appropriate γ and k 
nodes.   
To effectuate the update procedure correctly, each <key, value> pair should 
be supplemented with such data as:  
• identity data of an “author” of modifications confirmed by his 
digital certificate and the node ID of the used terminal; 
• exact date and time of update; 
• an original file’s key and ID of a node that stores it (in the case of its 
off-line status). 
When some user publishes successive modifications of the same file, the k 
nodes that store the file or the relative metadata simply remove his precedent 
updates every time a new update is performed. 
Figure 5.6 illustrates data modification and update processes. In the presented 
example two nodes of level B (0011 and 0000) engaged in the same task 
download a file to be modified from two (amongst γ possible) diverse nodes 
(1000 and 1111) of level A responsible of this file (Step 1). After some 
necessary modifications have been made, the nodes 0011 and 0000 store the 
modified files at nodes from which the original versions have been 
downloaded (Step 2). Then, according to the tree-like data memorization 
model, replicas of the modified files are sent at γ responsible nodes by the 
nodes 1000 and 1111. As shown in the figure, the modifications of the node 
0000 are effectuated later than those of 0011. So, the file with modifications 
made by the node 0000 will be the last version of this file.  
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Fig. 5.6 Data modification and update 
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5.3.7 Security mechanisms and countermeasures 
involved in the presented solution 
Secure assignment of node identifiers 
In section 5.3.3 we have already described the procedure of secure 
assignment of node identifiers that consists in random attribution of IDs by 
trusted bootstrap terminals. As noted above, a node with ID, that is obtained 
as a hash function (SHA-1) of its static IP address, is potentially vulnerable to 
masquerade attacks. So, we try to avoid this undesired effect applying the 
described ID assignment mechanism. 
Use of certificates 
For effective handling of privileges regarding data access, it is necessary that 
each node, before downloading or modifying some file, is able to 
demonstrate its belonging to a department with the privileges equal or greater 
than those of the file’s source node. To avoid some problems regarding 
identity falsification, the use of digital certificates makes sense.  
A personal digital certificate associates a public key to some identity. Only 
the possessor of the certificate knows the corresponding private key, that 
permits him/her to create own digital signature and decrypt information 
encoded by the public key.  
In our case, such certificate is attributed to a certain network terminal and 
attests its identity and level of privileges it possesses. So, regarding the 
described enterprise model, certificates of types A, B and C enable nodes of 
the corresponding levels to access, store and modify data within the same-
name sub-trees and those of the lower levels (for B and C nodes). The 
certificates of type M are assigned to the nodes with a manager status and 
permit them to access, store, modify and cancel data produced and stored by 
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any other node.  
Countermeasures against specific attacks of DHT-based P2P environment  
Regarding specific attacks of DHT-based environment, the described system 
proposes the following countermeasures and protective mechanisms. 
 Some effects of incorrect lookup rooting attacks can be avoided due to 
iterative character of Kademlia’s lookup algorithm. In Kademlia such attacks 
can be detected by checking the progress of lookup at each step. In the case 
of absence of any progress (blatantly incorrect query forwarding), lookup 
process is backtracked to the previous “right” step and then proceeds with 
looking for an alternative direction of the search.  
Incorrect routing update attack can be prevented, because in Kademlia the 
update of routing tables is implemented by a node automatically, as a 
“secondary effect” of ordinary lookups and interactions with other nodes.  
Sybil attacks are not excluded, but lookup efficiency is improved by parallel 
routing (issuing α lookup requests at a time).   
Partition attacks are prevented by involving trusted bootstrap terminals that 
should be contacted by nodes to join the network.     
Mechanism of replication and storage of resources at the γ closest nodes 
prevents storage and retrieval attacks. So, even if one of the γ nodes 
maliciously denies the existence of data it is responsible for, there are other 
nodes enabled to provide the same resource. In this way we also eliminate a 
single point of failure represented by a unique node that stores a certain file. 
Moreover, the system can effectively cope with overload of targeted nodes 
with garbage packets, that represents a DHT analogue of Denial of Service 
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attack. The tree-like data memorization model mitigates the impact of such 
attack due to uniform distribution of a file’s replicas within the network. 
Since the replicas are stored in different sub-trees, even in the case of 
localized overload attacks to nodes of some selected part of the key-space, it 
is always possible to find at least one active node that stores a desired file’s 
replica. 
It is possible to additionally improve security of this solution applying the 
techniques for trust and reputation management presented in the previous 
chapter, i.e. using DHT mechanisms integrated with the proposed reputation 
evaluation algorithm.             
5.4 Findings and future work 
Kademlia DHT represents a secure, reliable and flexible infrastructure for 
data storage and retrieval system in enterprise networks. 
Application of DHT principles to enterprise network environment is a novel 
approach, that allows to avoid such problems of centralized systems as denial 
of service, packet filtering attacks and low resistance to failure.  
Taking in consideration specifics of deployment of P2P mechanisms in 
enterprise environment, it has been demonstrated that Kademlia is the most 
adaptable one to some particularities of hierarchical systems with clear 
distribution of different privileges and tasks between nodes. It is explained by 
the tree-like data structure of Kademlia DHTs. 
Some novel approaches regarding the assignment of node identifiers and data 
storage in Kademlia are proposed: prefix identifiers are introduced to handle 
data access privileges, and the tree-like data memorization model is proposed 
to improve the storage mechanisms. 
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 It is important to note that the presented system of data storage, retrieval and 
collective file editing can be adapted to any type of collaborative 
environment. It is not necessary to be applied to closed systems with specific 
hierarchical architectures.  
So, while in the case of the hierarchical enterprise environment the prefixes 
are used to identify work groups with diverse privileges regarding data 
access, in the case of a network community consisting of nodes with equal 
“rights” the mechanism of prefixes can be used to distinguish groups with 
different interests, goals, tasks, etc.  
We are currently working toward a software implementation of the described 
solution using available open-source implementations of Kademlia protocol. 
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6 Conclusions 
DHT-based peer-to-peer systems represent a quite young field of network 
technologies (the first four DHTs — CAN, Chord, Pastry, and Tapestry —
were introduced about the same time in 2001). Overlay networks using DHT 
mechanisms offer many advantages, such as: efficient routing performance, 
high scalability, high exact-match accuracy of search, no single point of 
failure. 
At the same time such systems represent a particular environment with 
specific security problems that are poorly studied yet. Even though DHT 
lookup algorithms provide some countermeasures against several effects of 
specific attacks, all these countermeasures have a “short-term” character: 
they help to cope only with instantaneous effects of malicious activity and 
don’t resolve the problem of detection and elimination of malevolent contacts 
from routing tables. Moreover, for some specific security problems of DHT-
based environment (e.g. incorrect routing updates in the case of recursive 
lookups, inconsistent behaviour, Sybil attacks) opportune countermeasures 
don’t exist. Besides, some types of malicious activity in such kind of 
networks can cause the same problems as Byzantine failure in distributed 
computer systems. 
This thesis has addressed the problem of integration of reputation 
management mechanisms and other instruments used in distributed 
computing environment with lookup processes in DHT-based peer-to-peer 
networks in order to improve resilience of such systems to destructive actions 
of malevolent or faulty components. The goal of this integration is to obtain a 
more efficient, less expensive (in terms of data transferred, computational 
resources involved and time spent) and possibly simple solution to cope with 
the specific problems of DHT-based environment. 
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A particular accent has been given to DHT-based environments with a 
collaborative nature. Unlike most of existing reputation management 
systems, we don’t use the number of successful downloads as the main 
instrument to evaluate the trustworthiness of peers. It has been proposed to 
consider any type of interactions between nodes. It is explained by the fact 
that file sharing is not a unique service supported by DHT-based P2P 
systems. There are other application areas for P2P (e.g. collaborative and 
distributed computing) where it is important to consider such aspects as a risk 
factor, a “stay on-line” time or a number of requests without reply.   
The solution that has been provided consists in application of a combination 
of different reputation mechanisms provided by some previously analyzed 
techniques for trust and reputation management in P2P. This solution 
represents an individual mechanism of reputation management for a single 
peer based on its own experience.  
Then, it has been proposed to integrate the individual mechanism of  
reputation evaluation with an algorithm for trust and reputation management 
that takes in consideration the community context.  
In particular, it has been proposed to introduce solutions for Byzantine 
Agreement used in distributed computing environment into a trust 
management algorithm designed for P2P networks based on DHTs, in order 
to obtain a simpler and efficient algorithm for reputation management in 
completely distributed environment. The complexity evaluation of the 
proposed solution compared to the previously proposed EigenTrust algorithm 
for reputation management in terms of number of messages sent per node 
shows that the algorithm presented in this thesis is less “expensive” in both 
number of messages sent and computational and memory resources involved. 
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Another issue considered in this work regards the application of DHT 
mechanisms to lookup and data retrieval processes in hierarchical 
collaborative environments, in particular, in enterprise networks. 
Centralized organization of current enterprise networks doesn’t represent an 
ideal solution in terms of information security and reliability. Denial of 
service, packet filtering and low resistance to failure are frequent 
shortcomings of centralized systems. To avoid the above problems it has 
been proposed to introduce a distributed P2P data organization system to the 
enterprise environment. Kademlia-based Distributed Hash Tables has been 
applied to organize data storage and retrieval systems of enterprise networks. 
Due to the tree-like structure of the identifier space and the prefix matching 
lookup algorithm, Kademlia is easily adaptable to the context of enterprise 
hierarchy, e.g. it facilitates the assignment of different privileges regarding 
data access, to various system entities. The presented solution provides 
geographically separated users of enterprise networks with possibility to 
share, modify and publish data in parallel way. 
Further optimization of the proposed algorithms and software 
implementations of the presented solutions are the future goals of the 
research activity presented in this thesis.   
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